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The Case for Replacing the Independent 
Intermediary Doctrine with Proximate 
Cause and Fourth Amendment Review in 





Plaintiffs who file claims under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act encounter 
a strange blend of civil rights, tort, and criminal procedure laws.  When civil 
rights plaintiffs sue officers and government agencies for violations of their 
Fourth Amendment rights, federal courts may cut off liability using qualified 
immunity, but they may also use a lesser-known defense of sorts called the 
independent intermediate doctrine.  When courts permit officers to raise both 
qualified immunity and the doctrine, the two defensive theories provide 
officers something akin to absolute immunity.  The doctrine treats judges, 
prosecutors, grand jurors, and fact finders as superseding agents who shield 
officers from liability once they find probable cause, even though these 
intermediaries’ actions are foreseeable.  The doctrine is heavily relied upon 
in the Fifth Circuit, but every Circuit aside from the First has adopted it.  The 
Supreme Court has rejected the doctrine because it ignores congressional 
intent and proximate cause principles that existed at the time the Civil Rights 
Act was created.  The doctrine heavily favors law enforcement officer 
defendants and leaves civil rights plaintiffs without a path to trial or a remedy 
for their civil rights violations.  This Article is the first to examine this 
 
  Professor, South Texas College of Law Houston. B.A., Texas Tech University; J.D., Texas 
Tech University School of Law.  I would like to thank my employer and my family for their continued 
support and encouragement of my scholarship.  And I would like to thank the plaintiffs in the Waco 
biker mass arrest cases who inspired my § 1983 articles.  You may have lost the first battle on the 
independent intermediary doctrine, but you may yet win the war. 
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doctrine, its history, its impact, and the serious confusion it has caused among 
federal circuit and district courts nationwide.  The Article examines the many 
criticisms and detractors of the doctrine and suggests the only way to unify 
precedent, honor congressional intent, and properly review unlawful arrests, 
searches, and seizures is by using an analysis that includes proximate cause 
and the Fourth Amendment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 1983 assigns liability to governments and their agents when they 
violate the constitutional rights of citizens.1  Many civil rights lawsuits allege 
Fourth Amendment violations following an unreasonable search and seizure, 
an unlawful arrest, or the use of excessive force.2  Even though these specific 
violations invoke the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has said § 1983, 
housed within the Civil Rights Act, creates a “species of tort liability.”3  
Consequently, these violations are often referred to as “constitutional torts.”4  
The Act’s purpose is to deter state actors from using their power and position 
to commit constitutional torts and to compensate citizens when that deterrence 
fails.5 
Section 1983 includes no immunities on its face.6  However, the Supreme 
Court has upheld common law defenses that were available when the Act was 
created if they do not conflict with Congress’s intent.7  Qualified immunity is 
one such defense that protects law enforcement officers unless they violate a 
clearly established law.8  When officers successfully claim immunity—and 
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2020); see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 
(1978) (noting that cities, governments, and governing bodies can be held liable under § 1983).  See 
generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174–75, 190–91 (1961) (explaining that the Civil Rights Act 
of 1971 was enacted in reaction to certain states’ failure to “enforce the laws with an equal hand”), 
overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of. Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 2. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392 (1989) (describing the Fourth and Eighth Amendments 
as “the two most textually obvious sources of constitutional protection against physically abusive 
governmental conduct”); see also Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 163 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that 
the plaintiffs raised constitutional grounds based upon “unreasonable search and seizure, false arrest, 
battery, excessive force, and malicious prosecution”).  But see, e.g., Cornett v. Longois, 871 F. Supp. 
918, 921 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (recognizing a circuit split as to whether malicious prosecution is a 
constitutional tort or a state tort claim only); Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F. Supp. 390, 397 (E.D. La. 1971) 
(raising allegations of civil rights violations stemming from the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments), aff’d, 467 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 3. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976). 
 4. McMillian v. Monroe Cty., 520 U.S. 781, 784 (1997).  The concept of “constitutional torts” 
began with Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.  403 U.S. 388, 390–
97 (1971) (holding that plaintiff’s civil rights violation was not limited to state tort claims but could 
encompass constitutional violations of his Fourth Amendment rights). 
 5. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). 
 6. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 7. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 164; see Malley, 475 U.S. at 339–40. 
 8. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739–40 (2002). 
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they often do9—the plaintiff is barred from suit.10 
Another barrier to suit raised by civil rights defendants is the independent 
intermediary doctrine.11  The doctrine was created by the Fifth Circuit, but 
federal courts nationwide have employed it.12  Other federal courts call it the 
“taint exception,” the “no causation” rationale, the “superseding cause” rule, 
and the “breaks-the-chain-of-causation” principle.13   
Simply stated, the doctrine says that unless officers lied or omitted facts 
when they submitted the case for review to an intermediary—a magistrate, 
judge, prosecutor, or grand jury—that intermediary’s independent review 
insulates the officer from liability even if that officer violated constitutional 
rights.14  Essentially, courts using the doctrine hold that the intermediary’s 
decision to move forward with the case acts as a superseding cause, which 
breaks the chain of causation from the officer’s illegal act to the plaintiff’s 
injuries that flowed as a consequence from that act.15  The problem with this 
doctrine is two-fold.  First, that any of these intermediaries finds probable 
cause after the officer does, whether or not it objectively exists, is foreseeable, 
thus it is not a superseding event.  It should not sever liability for an officer 
making an unlawful arrest.  Second, the United States Supreme Court has 
stated this doctrine is not rooted in the history of civil rights law—proximate 
cause is—and therefore, is not a valid defense to a civil rights claim.16 
 
 9. MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, at § 3.19 (C) 
(Aspen 4th Ed. Supplement, 2020) (finding that § 1983 civil rights cases are often resolved in favor 
of the officer through the defense of qualified immunity). 
 10. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 512 (1985) (“Qualified immunity . . . is an immunity from 
suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is 
erroneously permitted to go to trial.”). 
 11. The doctrine was created by the Fifth Circuit in Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1193 
(5th Cir. 1977), but further developed by Smith v. Gonzales, 670 F.2d 522, 526 (5th Cir. 1982) and 
Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1427–28 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 12. See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 161. 
 13. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 n.7 (1986) (referring to the district court’s use of the “no 
causation” rationale); Briggs v. Malley, 748 F.2d 715, 717 (1st Cir. 1984) (applying the “chain of 
causation” principle), aff’d, 475 U.S. 335 (1986); Republic Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Charles, No. CV 
17-5967, 2018 WL 310378, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 5, 2018) (applying the “taint exception”); Adams v. 
Parsons, No. Civ. A. 2:10-0423, 2011 WL 1464856, at *7 (S.D.W. Va. Apr. 15, 2011) (using “the 
superseding cause rule”); Fitch v. Morrow, No. Civ.A. H-03-1686, 2005 WL 1828592, at *5, *8 (S.D. 
Tex. Aug. 1, 2005) (explaining the plaintiff’s use of the “‘breaks the causal chain’ theory” and the 
court’s use of the “‘breaks the chain of causation’ principle”), aff’d, 199 F. App’x 347 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 14. See Hand, 838 F.2d at 1427–28. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Malley, 475 U.S. at 344–45. 
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In Malley v. Briggs, the Supreme Court said it wanted to make clear that 
this doctrine should not be used in civil rights cases because it was 
“inconsistent” with § 1983 and  proximate causation principles that make a 
man responsible for the expected consequences of his acts.17  The Court stated 
that torts common law has consistently recognized a causal link between the 
criminal complaint and the arrest that follows, which § 1983 also recognizes.18  
The Supreme Court therefore endorsed a Fourth Amendment analysis to 
decide whether an officer should be qualifiedly immune from suit: 
[T]he same standard of objective reasonableness that we applied in 
the context of a suppression hearing in Leon . . . defines the qualified 
immunity accorded an officer whose request for a warrant allegedly 
caused an unconstitutional arrest.  Only where the warrant application 
is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief 
in its existence unreasonable . . . will the shield of immunity be lost.19 
While Malley’s facts involved an arrest pursuant to a warrant, the Court 
emphasized that under no circumstances should courts continue to use the 
doctrine in § 1983 cases.20 
After Malley, it seemed that federal courts would stop using the 
doctrine.21  But like a phoenix rising from the ashes, so it arose again two 
years later, resurrected by a stubborn or oblivious Fifth Circuit Court, which 
made no reference whatsoever to the Supreme Court’s repudiation of the 
doctrine.22 
Since then, the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of 
 
 17. Malley, 475 U.S. at 344 n.7. 
 18. See id. 
 19. Id. at 344–45 (referencing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)) (citation omitted). 
 20. See id. at 344 n.7.  The Supreme Court called the doctrine the “‘no causation’ rationale,” but 
the district court relied on the Fifth Circuit’s cases that created what the Fifth Circuit called the 
“independent intermediary doctrine.”  See Buehler v. City of Austin/Austin Police Dep’t, 824 F.3d 
548, 553 (5th Cir. 2016) (referring to “[past] cases applying the independent intermediary doctrine”); 
Briggs v. Malley, 748 F.2d 715, 716–17 (1st Cir. 1984) (explaining that the district court relied on two 
Fifth Circuit cases), aff’d, 475 U.S. 335 (1986). 
 21. See Malley, 475 U.S. at 344 n.7.  One federal court was actually hopeful that Malley v. Briggs 
would resolve the conflicts in federal courts on how to resolve these cases.  See Easton v. City of 
Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1448 (10th Cir. 1985) (“The circuit courts . . . are not in agreement, and at 
times even different panels within the same circuit appear to have been in unknowing conflict on the 
issue. . . .  Since the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Briggs, a definitive resolution of the 
matter is likely to be forthcoming.”). 
 22. See Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1427–28 (5th Cir. 1988). 
[Vol. 48: 1, 2021] Replacing the Independent Intermediary Doctrine 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
7 
Appeals have employed it.23  The Ninth Circuit uses its own variation of the 
doctrine, which includes a rebuttable presumption.24  The Eighth Circuit uses 
a torts foreseeability analysis, plus the doctrine.25  Finally, the Seventh Circuit 
has authored cases that use the doctrine  exclusively, use the Malley-endorsed 
analysis exclusively, use the doctrine and Malley-endorsed analysis 
combined, and use a torts foreseeability rule.26  Adding to the confusion, the 
Second, Fourth, and District of Columbia Circuits have opinions that endorse 
the doctrine, along with subsequent opinions that either reject it or endorse 
Malley without overruling the doctrine-friendly opinions.27  It is not just the 
circuit courts that are all over the place: some district courts have also issued 
opinions that contradict their circuit court’s preferred analysis.28  The only 
jurisdiction that is consistent is the First Circuit, which has repeatedly rejected 
the independent intermediary doctrine.29 
 
 23. See, e.g., Powers v. Hamilton Cty. Pub. Def. Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 609–12 (6th Cir. 2007); 
Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 293 (5th Cir. 2005); Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d 238, 250 (3d Cir. 
2004); Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649, 655–56 (10th Cir. 1990); Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 
1195 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 24. See Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384, 1390 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing the rebuttable 
presumption that the intermediary acted independently). 
 25. See Small v. McCrystal, 708 F.3d 997, 1006–07 (8th Cir. 2013) (relying on the causation rule 
and tort foreseeability notions to find that officers misrepresented facts on the warrant and that the 
ensuing arrests were a foreseeable result of their actions); Ames v. United States, 600 F.2d 183, 185–
86 (8th Cir. 1979) (using the causation analysis). 
 26. See e.g., Herzog v. Vill. of Winnetka, 309 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir. 2002) (engaging in a tort 
foreseeability analysis); King v. Young, 21 F.3d 430 (Table), *1, *3 (7th Cir. 1994) (using Malley 
exclusively); Jones v. City of Chi., 856 F.2d 985, 993–95 (7th Cir. 1988) (using the doctrine and 
Malley together); Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 943 (7th Cir. 1972) (using the doctrine exclusively 
in a pre-Malley period). 
 27. See e.g., Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 252–56 (4th Cir. 2017) (using the Malley analysis); 
Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 648 (4th Cir. 2012) (employing the doctrine); Kerman v. City of 
New York, 374 F.3d 93, 127 (2d Cir. 2004) (endorsing the Malley test); Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 
342, 352 (2d Cir. 2000) (rejecting the doctrine without overruling Townes v. City of New York, 176 
F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1999)); Townes, 176 F.3d at 147 (2d Cir. 1999) (using the doctrine); White v. 
Frank, 855 F.2d 956, 961 (2d Cir. 1988) (rejecting the doctrine); Edmond v. U.S. Postal Serv. Gen. 
Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 422–23 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (rejecting the doctrine without overruling Dellums 
v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 191–94 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); Dellums, 566 F.2d at 191–94 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(using the doctrine pre-Malley). 
 28. See, e.g., Carter v. Georgevich, 78 F. Supp. 2d 332, 334 (D. N.J. 2000) (using a foreseeability 
analysis, which contradicts the doctrine the Third Circuit has used); Hamrick v. City of Eustace, 732 
F. Supp. 1390, 1396 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (stating that the doctrine is inconsistent with § 1983 and using 
a Malley analysis, despite the Fifth Circuit’s continued endorsement of the former); Stevens v. Sanpete 
Cty., 640 F. Supp. 376, 384 n.13 (D. Utah 1986) (siding with Malley, even though the Tenth Circuit 
has used the doctrine), aff’d, 846 F.2d 76 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 29. See, e.g., Buenrostro v. Collazo, 973 F.2d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 1992); Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 
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Needless to say, this area of law is a mess.  Federal courts acknowledge 
that much.30  In one case, the Second Circuit listed decisions supporting, 
renouncing, or contradicting the doctrine’s use before concluding the opinions 
“yield[ed] few coherent principles.”31  The Third Circuit acknowledged 
tension in the case law, noting “the cases on intervening causes are legion and 
difficult to reconcile” before taking the easy way out and deciding the case on 
other grounds.32  The Fifth Circuit also recognized its created rule has been a 
source of friction in the federal courts.33  A Pennsylvania district court called 
the doctrine “unsettled,”34  while a Texas district court noted that the case that 
created the doctrine had its “detractors” and “other Federal Circuits are at 
variance with it.”35  None of these inconsistencies have been lost on civil rights 
plaintiffs, who have demanded that courts stop using the doctrine because it 
is at odds with the Supreme Court.36 
Section 1983 plaintiffs are upset because the doctrine makes it hard for 
them to get to trial.37  In these civil rights suits, defendants do not necessarily 
deny they violated rights or caused injuries.38  They simply hope the doctrine 
 
F.2d 196, 212–13 (1st Cir. 1987); Briggs v. Malley, 748 F.2d 715, 717–21 (1st Cir. 1984), aff’d, 475 
U.S. 335 (1986).  
 30. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. at 344 n.7; Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 865–
66 (9th Cir. 2008); Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 354–55 (2d Cir. 2000); Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 
1420, 1427–28 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 31. Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Zahrey, 221 F.3d at 351). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Buehler v. City of Austin/Austin Police Dep’t, 824 F.3d 548, 554 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 34. Cherry v. Garner, No. Civ.A. 03-CV-01696, 2004 WL 3019241, at *10, n.24 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 
30, 2004). 
 35. Von Williams v. City of Bridge City, 588 F. Supp. 1187, 1190 (E.D. Tex. 1984), aff’d sub 
nom. Williams v. City of Bridge City, 760 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 36. See El-Amin v. Flores, No. CV H-17-1268, 2018 WL 8733162, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2018) 
(holding that the doctrine conflicts with Malley and the “overwhelming circuit consensus”); Fitch v. 
Morrow, No. Civ.A. H-03-1686, 2005 WL 1828592, at *5–6 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2005) (discussing the 
plaintiff’s “strongly worded” question in a trial motion: “Just how long will the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, this Court, and other federal district courts bound by Fifth Circuit 
precedent, continue to openly ignore (if not consciously defy) the United States Supreme Court’s 
express rejection of the ‘breaks the causal chain’ theory?”), aff’d, 199 F. App’x 347 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 37. See Lynn Adelman, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Assault on Civil Rights, DISSENT MAG. (Fall 
2017), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/supreme-court-assault-civil-rights-section-1983. 
 38. E.g., Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1194 (11th Cir. 1989) (explaining that defendants “have 
not argued on appeal that their conduct in seizing and initially detaining Barts satisfied the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment, but have instead argued that various defenses bar the action against them even if they 
violated the Constitution”). 
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helps them avoid paying any damages.39  Unfortunately, though the Civil 
Rights Act identifies an injury, when the doctrine applies, the plaintiff is left 
without a remedy.  This hardly seems just to plaintiffs. 
A number of courts characterize the doctrine as another sort of qualified 
immunity.40  It creates a near impenetrable layer of double protection from 
suit: qualified immunity plus the independent intermediate doctrine.41  Courts 
recognize that this is akin to absolute immunity.42  The problem with this is 
that the Supreme Court has refused to give law enforcement officers absolute 
immunity.43  The doctrine creates added protection for officers by cutting off 
all future reviews of probable cause after the intermediary becomes involved 
in the case.  This goes against the Malley Court’s objectively reasonable 
standard, which requires trial and appellate courts to review the officer’s 
probable cause decision.44  
This article seeks to examine the historical background of the law, its 
formation and resilience, the inconsistencies that exist within it, the heavy 
burdens it places on plaintiffs, and the various reasons courts have upheld it, 
rejected it, or replaced it.  The author hopes to convince federal courts to 
abandon it and follow Supreme Court precedent, because the doctrine is 
inconsistent with civil rights law and historic proximate cause concepts, it 
leads to absurd and disparate results, and appellate Fourth Amendment de 
novo review is necessary to review allegations of Fourth Amendment civil 
rights violations. 
 
 39. See Adelman, supra note 37 (discussing Section 1983, how qualified immunity allows 
defendants to escape liability, and what defendants really have to pay for if they are convicted). 
 40. See Cruse v. Blackburn, No. CV 3:17-00485, 2018 WL 793501, at *5–7 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 16, 
2018); Atwood v. Cheney, No. 1:12-CV-168-SA-DAS, 2016 WL 3910658, at *4–8 (N.D. Miss. July 
14, 2016); Jones v. Eder, No. CV H-15-2919, 2016 WL 4571114, at *3–4 (S.D. Tex. July 19, 2016), 
aff’d, 778 F. App’x 327 (5th Cir. 2019); Basler v. Barron, No. CV H-15-2254, 2016 WL 1672573, at 
*3–4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2016); Eubanks v. Freburger, No. 11-60714-CIV, 2012 WL 4936061, at *3–
4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2012); Fitch, 2005 WL 1828592 at *10–11 (showing that both the original district 
court opinion and the appeal placed the doctrine’s analysis under a broader qualified immunity 
analysis). 
 41. See Kugle v. Shields, 62 F.3d 395, *4–5 (5th Cir. 1995) (examining how the independent 
intermediate doctrine and qualified immunity interact and coincide). 
 42. Id. at *4. (explaining that the doctrine essentially creates absolute immunity). 
 43. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339–43 (1986).  
 44. See Malley, 475 U.S. at 339–42. 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
To better understand the doctrine and its application to civil rights claims 
for false arrest and malicious prosecution, it is important to understand how 
the torts of false arrest and malicious prosecution—both of which require 
probable cause—developed over time, and how civil rights grew to 
encompass these claims.45  The Supreme Court begins its analysis with the 
common law of torts because it “provide[s] the appropriate starting point for 
the inquiry under § 1983,”46 so this is where the article begins. 
A. The Development of False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution Tort Law 
Before the Civil Rights Act came into being, and long before it was used 
to hold police officers accountable for civil rights violations, the New York 
Supreme Court in 1861 recognized that being free from “groundless arrest” is 
a right all citizens possess.47  In 1860, another New York court held that 
anyone who began a baseless legal proceeding against another would be liable 
for the resulting complaint, indictment, or legal action.48 
As early as 1895, state courts decided unlawful arrest claims where the 
defendant allegedly acted with malice.49  Courts were inconsistent about 
whether malice had to be present for civil liability to attach in cases with 
arrests lacking probable cause.50  No liability existed in cases with omissions 
or clerical errors in the arrest warrant.51  However, when the “offense” charged 
was not a crime,52 or when someone adopted or participated in a warrant later 
deemed void or unlawful, the defendant could be held liable.53  In 1900, one 
Missouri court said liability for false imprisonment extended to anyone who 
played a role in the imprisonment; it was not confined to the person who 
 
 45. See Jacques L. Schillaci, Unexamined Premises: Toward Doctrinal Purity in 1983 Malicious 
Prosecution Doctrine, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 439, 443–69 (2002) (discussing the history of malicious 
prosecution and Section 1983). 
 46. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994) (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257–
258 (1978)). 
 47. See Comfort v. Fulton, 39 Barb. 56, 57 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1861). 
 48. Perkins v. Mitchell, 31 Barb. 461, 468 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1860). 
 49. See J.E. Macy, Annotation, False Imprisonment: Liability of Private Citizen for False Arrest 
by Officer, 21 A.L.R.2d 649–51, 664 (1952). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 652–54.  
 52. Id. at 655–59, 665. 
 53. Id. at 659–61. 
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unlawfully seized the plaintiff.54 
Over time, courts began to hold that when the truth was laid before a judge 
without dishonesty and the judge found probable cause to begin criminal 
proceedings, lay complainants and prosecutors who honestly believed the 
crime had occurred could not be held liable.55  These cases arose at a time 
when the local magistrate would hear from live witnesses and the prosecutor 
before a person was arrested; if the magistrate found the charges truthful, an 
arrest warrant would issue.56 
After the turn of the century, New York courts determined that when a 
judge found probable cause that a crime was committed by the accused, that 
decision protected the complainant, a private citizen, from civil liability unless 
he omitted material facts or lied.57  In California, if the affiant’s claim 
produced some evidence of the charged offense, it was equally sufficient to 
protect the complainant.58  However, when the basis for the affiant’s belief 
was missing from the affidavit,59 or when the allegations were too stale or too 
speculative,60 the defendant was liable for damages. 
In 1900, the California Supreme Court held that only when the affiant’s 
statements amounted to probable cause did the judge have authority to arrest 
and deprive the accused of his freedom.61  In other states, if a judge 
erroneously found probable cause, but the mistake was an honest one, the 
affiant was not liable.62  However, if the affiant’s accusations did not allege a 
crime63 or there were fatal errors in the affidavit,64 the defendant was liable.  
In the middle of the twentieth century, courts began to apply these rules 
designed for lay people to government and state actors.65 
 
 54. Monson v. Rouse, 86 Mo. App. 97, 100–01 (1900). 
 55. Macy, supra note 49, at 662. 
 56. Id. at 662–63. 
 57. See, e.g., Coleman v. Brown, 110 N.Y.S. 701, 703 (App. Div. 1908); Smith v. Bell Fyfe 
Foundry Co., 111 N.Y.S. 202, 205 (App. Div. 1908). 
 58. See Dusy v. Helm, 59 Cal. 188, 190 (1881). 
 59. Fkumoto v. Marsh, 62 P. 303, 304–05 (Cal. 1900). 
 60. Neves v. Costa, 89 P. 860, 862–65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1907). 
 61. Fkumoto, 62 P. at 304. 
 62. Macy, supra note 49, at 676–677 (discussing decisions from Illinois and Kansas). 
 63. See Hauss v. Kohlar, 25 Kan. 640, 643–45 (1881). 
 64. See Bryan v. Congdon, 86 F. 221, 222–25 (8th Cir. 1898) (“[I]f a person has been arrested and 
imprisoned under color of legal process, which is thereafter set aside for irregularity, the person who 
set that process in motion is responsible in damages to him upon whom the indignity and deprivation 
of liberty have been visited.”). 
 65. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961) (holding that police officers were in violation 
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B. The Development of § 1983 Liability 
Just before state courts began grappling with citizen liability for false 
arrests and malicious prosecutions, the United States was beginning to 
confront claims of state and federal rights violations.66  In the 1870s, the 
United States Congress and President Grant were concerned that states, 
particularly those in the South, were incapable or unwilling to halt civil rights 
violations committed by the Ku Klux Klan.67  States had legal remedies to 
address the civil rights violations, but they were not being enforced equally.68  
Congress’s main purpose in creating what was then known as the Ku Klux 
Klan Act was to provide a federal remedy for federal rights violations.69  A 
senator from Ohio said the new Act “authorizes any person who is deprived 
of any right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the Constitution of the 
United States, to bring an action against the wrongdoer in the Federal 
courts.”70  Nearly 100 years later, the Supreme Court applied this Act to those 
acting under color of law.71 
In 1961, the Supreme Court held in Monroe v. Pape that the Civil Rights 
Act, formerly known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, applied to Illinois officers who 
unlawfully ransacked a man’s home, detained him, and interrogated him.72  
The Court held, in extending this liability to officers, that the law “should be 
read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for 
the natural consequences of his actions.”73  The Court expressly declined to 
extend liability to municipalities or governments.74  Nearly two decades later, 
the Supreme Court interpreted the word “persons” subject to § 1983 liability 
to include cities, governments, and governing bodies.75 
The common law has created defenses to § 1983 liability, many of which 
 
of the Fourth Amendment when they arrested a plaintiff without a warrant and refused to bring him 
before a judge for a probable cause hearing), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of. Soc. 
Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 66. Id. at 170–71 (1961). 
 67. Id. at 172, 174. 
 68. Id. at 174–75. 
 69. Id. at 172, 174–76, 178. 
 70. Id. at 179–80. 
 71. Id. at 188–92. 
 72. Id. at 169, 191. 
 73. Id. at 187. 
 74. Id. at 187–92. 
 75. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). 
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center around the concept of whether the officer acted in good faith or is 
otherwise immune from suit.76  Qualified immunity is probably the most 
common defense raised under the good faith umbrella in § 1983 cases.77  It 
protects a police officer in two ways.78  First, it protects an officer whose 
“conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 
of which a reasonable person would have known.”79  Second, it protects an 
officer when his conduct was objectively reasonable.80   
It is important to note that this objectively reasonable standard also exists 
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,81 which causes potential 
misunderstandings when courts are unclear which objectively reasonable 
standard they are relying upon in § 1983 cases.  When civil rights cases center 
around unlawful arrests and seizures, objective reasonableness could refer 
either to the qualified immunity standard, the probable cause standard, or 
both.  
When it comes to qualified immunity, the standard is objective, rather 
than subjective, because a subjective belief would require testimony from the 
officer and a trial; the qualified immunity officers enjoy shields them from 
liability and the lawsuit itself.82  Qualified immunity ensures that only officers 
who had fair notice that their conduct was illegal can be sued.83  Qualified 
 
 76. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (calling qualified immunity a “‘good faith’ 
defense”). 
 77. E.g., id. 
 78. See, e.g., Cerone v. Brown, 246 F.3d 194, 199 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 
818, and citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)). 
 79. Jenkins v. City of N.Y., 478 F.3d 76, 87 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 80. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1986) (“[A]n officer who knows that objectively 
unreasonable decisions will be actionable may be motivated to reflect . . . upon whether he has a 
reasonable basis for believing that [he has] probable cause.  But such reflection is desirable, because 
it reduces the likelihood that the officer’s request for a warrant will be premature.  Premature requests 
for warrants are at best a waste of judicial resources; at worst, they lead to premature arrests, which 
may injure the innocent or, by giving the basis for a suppression motion, benefit the guilty.”).  For a 
more in-depth discussion of qualified immunity and the civil rights defendants who attempt to claim 
it, see Amanda Peters, Mass Arrests & the Particularized Probable Cause Requirement, 60 B.C.L. 
REV. 217, 240–46 (2019). 
 81. E.g., Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 66 (2014) (“The Fourth Amendment tolerates only 
reasonable mistakes, and those mistakes—whether of fact or of law—must be objectively reasonable.  
We do not examine the subjective understanding of the particular officer involved.”). 
 82. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815–16; Jenkins, 478 F.3d at 87 n.9. 
 83. See Malley, 475 U.S. at 344 (“[W]e hold that the same standard of objective reasonableness 
that we applied in the context of a suppression hearing . . . defines the qualified immunity accorded an 
officer whose request for a warrant allegedly caused an unconstitutional arrest.”); see also Jenkins, 
478 F.3d at 87.  
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immunity is one type of defense to civil rights cases, whereas the independent 
intermediary doctrine is another. 
III. THE INDEPENDENT INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE 
In the 1970s, the Fifth Circuit created an additional bar to plaintiffs’ 
§ 1983 lawsuits: what would later become known as the independent 
intermediary doctrine.84  The court held that if all the facts that would support 
a probable cause decision are presented to an independent intermediary and 
the presenter does not omit or misrepresent any facts, the causal chain of the 
officer’s unlawful arrest is broken by the intermediary’s probable cause.85  
However, if the officer withholds facts or lies to the intermediary, the taint of 
the unlawful arrest remains and the plaintiff can proceed to trial.86 
This created a unique theory of causation, with no roots in civil rights or 
traditional torts law.  Historically, courts used proximate cause in malicious 
prosecution and false arrest cases.87  The independent intermediary doctrine 
magically absolves officers from unlawful arrests as much as a supervening 
cause would, even though the consequences that flow from a false arrest are 
foreseeable whereas a superseding event is not.  All the officer needs to relieve 
himself from a lawsuit using the independent intermediary doctrine is to have 
a judge, prosecutor, or grand jury to review the case, which is inevitable.  
There is nothing supervening about these actors’ roles in the process.  Their 
presence, which is predictable, should not cut off liability for an officer in a 
civil rights case who should have foreseen that his arrest violated the 
plaintiff’s civil rights. 
 When this doctrine is applied, it has two practical results: it bars trial and 
appellate judges from reviewing probable cause de novo, and it ensures most 
§ 1983 plaintiffs never make it to trial.88  In order to better understand the 
 
 84. See Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1427–28 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. at 1428. 
 87. E.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (noting that a man is “responsible for the 
natural consequences of his actions”); Monson v. Rouse, 86 Mo. App. 97, 100–01 (1900) (holding 
anyone involved in false arrest liable); Perkins v. Mitchell, 31 Barb. 461, 468 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1860) 
(holding person liable for filing baseless charge). 
 88. See, e.g., Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 292–93 (5th Cir. 2005) (declining to review de novo 
the trial court’s ruling regarding a juvenile’s interrogation which insulated the officer from § 1983 
liability); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (“[A]fter-the-fact scrutiny by courts of 
the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review.  A magistrate’s 
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independent intermediary doctrine, it is important to examine its evolution.  
The next section will refer to the progress of the doctrine’s creation as a 
“story” due to the many plot twists in its history. 
A. The Federal Courts Shape, Obliterate, Resurrect, and Defend the 
Doctrine 
This is the part of the story when the doctrine is created.  The doctrine 
began with Rodriguez v. Ritchey, an en banc plurality opinion with one 
concurrence and three dissents.89  In that case, FBI agents mistook Margaret 
Rodriguez for Margaret Waltz, who was involved in an illegal gambling 
enterprise.90  A year after Rodriguez’s arrest, her lawyer discovered her case 
was one of mistaken identity.91  After her case was dismissed because 
prosecutors realized officers had arrested the wrong Margaret, Rodriguez 
sued, alleging officers unlawfully arrested her without probable cause.92  The 
defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing they pursued charges 
based upon their good faith belief they arrested the true suspect, and the judge 
granted the motion.93 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit was torn between denying a federal common 
law remedy for the agents’ negligence and permitting Rodriguez to have a 
trial.94  In the end, the court determined that “if the facts supporting an arrest 
are put before an intermediate such as a magistrate or grand jury, the 
intermediate’s decision breaks the causal chain and insulates an initiating 
party.”95  Because a grand jury indicted her, its decision shielded the officers 
 
‘determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.’”) (citation 
omitted).  But see Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (“We therefore hold that as a 
general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo 
on appeal.”). 
 89. 556 F.2d 1185, 1194–1209 (5th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1047 (1978). 
 90. Id. at 1187. 
 91. Id.at 1188. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1189–90 (“The federal common law jurisdictional base has a somewhat nebulous place 
in this suit.  Ms. Rodriguez does not assert a federal common law cause of action, and ordinarily this 
would end the matter.  It could be argued, however, that such a claim is implicit . . . .  Moreover, the 
panel majority . . . drew upon general common law tort theory to bolster its conclusion that a cause of 
action had been stated.  As a result, we deem it appropriate to consider whether a federal common law 
claim is present to support jurisdiction in this case.”). 
 95. Id. at 1193.  
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from liability.96  Moreover, the court held her arrest did not violate her 
constitutional rights because actual innocence does not vitiate the lawfulness 
of the arrest.97  The court ultimately dismissed her suit.98 
Because the concept of insulation by an intermediate in a civil rights case 
was borrowed from tort law,99 the court cited to an American Law Report 
(A.L.R.) article written in 1952 about private citizen liability for false arrest 
as support.100  The Court also cited to the Restatement (Second) of Torts.101  
The Restatement section cited by the court references tort cases with private 
citizens who were not civilly liable because they did not persuade or influence 
the arrest decision.102 
The court’s reliance on these tort sources was surprising given the fact 
that federal courts nationwide were holding § 1983 covered government 
agents’ constitutional torts.103  Sixteen years before Rodriguez was decided, 
the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape sought to resolve conflicts among 
circuits interpreting § 1983 by holding the Civil Rights Act subjected 
government agents who acted under color of law to liability for violations of 
the Fourth Amendment.104  It is therefore hard to reconcile why the Fifth 
Circuit created its own rule and relied on secondary sources that addressed 
private citizen liability when the Supreme Court had already resolved the issue 
of liability for state actors.  Rodriguez was factually analogous to the law the 
Supreme Court created, not the secondary sources cited.105 
 
 96. Id.  at 1194. 
 97. Id. at 1190–91, 1192 n.24. 
 98. Id. at 1194. 
 99. See, e.g., Hopkinson v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 164 N.E. 104, 106 (N.Y. 1928) (explaining that 
the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution case must rebut probable cause by showing the defendant 
omitted facts or falsified evidence that would have impacted the magistrate’s or prosecutor’s decision).  
As the above case illuminates, there are concepts from the doctrine present in older cases, but those 
cases were tort cases, not civil rights cases.  Id. 
 100. Rodriguez, 556 F.2d at 1193 n.34 (citing Macy, supra note 49, at 643, 662–65, 674–79). 
 101. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 45A cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965)). 
 102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 45A cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 103. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191–92 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. 
Dep’t of. Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 104. Id. at 172–92. 
 105. Compare Rodriguez, 556 F.2d at 1186–88, 1192–93 (dismissing a case where the appellant 
was negligently arrested in her own beauty parlor and indicted on gambling charges by a detective 
because the court stated there was no constitutional violation or common law remedy) with Monroe, 
365 U.S. at 171 (“Allegation of facts constituting a deprivation under color of state authority of a right 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment satisfies to that extent the requirement of [42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983].”). 
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The Fifth Circuit had another opportunity to address officer liability for 
civil rights violations five years later in Smith v. Gonzales.106  After Douglas 
Smith had an argument with his daughter’s boyfriend, someone falsely 
accused him of having an incestuous relationship with his daughter.107  As a 
result of this allegation, investigating officer Thomas Lane sought to commit 
Smith to a psychiatric ward and was successful; Smith spent weeks committed 
to an insane asylum.108  A grand jury indicted Smith for sexual crimes, 
following his trial, a jury acquitted him, and the prosecutor dismissed another 
pending case against him.109  Smith sued Lane for the civil commitment, 
arrest, and malicious prosecution.110  Lane won the civil suit.111 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the lawful arrest warrant 
invalidated Smith’s false arrest claim.112  The court said, “The [C]onstitution 
does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested . . . If it did, section 
1983 would provide a cause of action for every defendant acquitted—indeed 
for every suspect released.”113  The court found that the prosecutors and judges 
made their own decisions to move forward on Smith’s case, rendering any bad 
faith Lane had irrelevant.114  When it came to the malicious prosecution claim, 
the court found that the independent intermediaries’ decisions broke any 
causal chain stemming from Lane’s actions.115 
Smith connected the idea of good faith and intermediaries to the duties of 
officers, warrants, and probable cause in two ways.  First, it found that just as 
subjective good faith is irrelevant when an officer violates the law, so too is 
subjective bad faith when the arrest is supported by a valid warrant or probable 
cause.116  Second, it found an officer has a legal duty to arrest a person once a 
valid warrant issues, regardless of his feelings about the defendant.117  In this 
way, Smith was the first decision to connect its new tort causation theory to 
Fourth Amendment law. 
 
 106. 670 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 107. Id. at 524–25. 
 108. Id. at 525. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 525. 
 112. Id. at 526. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 527. 
 117. Id. 
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This is the part of the story when the Fifth Circuit does not want to use 
the doctrine, defendants insist it must, but the court finds a partial way out.  In 
Wheeler v. Cosden Oil & Chemical Co., the Fifth Circuit originally ruled that 
Texas agents who unlawfully arrested two men based on false statements in 
an arrest warrant were liable to the plaintiffs for malicious prosecution and 
unlawful arrest.118  The court used a Fourth Amendment analysis in 
determining these rights had been violated.119  However, the defendants 
requested a rehearing because the Fifth Circuit had not considered causation; 
both the first and second opinion were decided after the court’s Smith 
decision.120  In response, the court begrudgingly said it was “constrained” to 
follow Smith because it was “the law of the Circuit, and we must follow it.”121  
The Fifth Circuit cleverly, and with rebellious flare, narrowed both 
Rodriguez’s and Smith’s holdings to false arrest claims by stating neither 
decision applied the doctrine to malicious prosecution claims.122  Because the 
court limited the doctrine, the plaintiffs were permitted to move forward on 
the malicious prosecution claim even if the doctrine put an end to their false 
arrest claim.123 
This is the part of the story when the doctrine is adopted by a Rhode Island 
district court, but is subsequently repudiated by the First Circuit and the 
Supreme Court.  In 1981, Rhode Island State Police officers arrested James 
and Louisa Briggs for drug possession.124  Police investigators heard two 
vague references to marijuana use in a wiretap of a phone call about a Briggs 
family party.125  Based on that phone call, Corporal Edward Malley authorized 
the arrests of twenty-two people for drug possession; the warrants were signed 
by a judge.126  After their arrest, a grand jury chose not to return an indictment 
against them.127 
James and Louisa then sued Malley under § 1983, alleging he violated 
 
 118. 734 F.2d 254, 256, 260–62 (5th Cir. 1984), reh’g denied, 744 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 119. Id. at 257, 261. 
 120. Wheeler v. Cosden Oil & Chem. Co., 744 F.2d at 1132–1133. 
 121. Id. at 1132 (“We are constrained to agree with Appellees that Smith v. Gonzales, 670 F.2d 522 
(5th Cir. 1982), governs this aspect of the appeal.”). 
 122. See id. at 1132–33. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 337–38 (1986). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 337–38. 
 127. Id. at 338. 
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their rights.128  The district court, however, “found police officers to be 
immune from liability for negligently seeking warrants without probable 
cause.”129  The court alternately relied upon the Rodriguez130 and Smith131 
decisions for support.132  The court held that the judge, acting as intermediary, 
broke the causal connection between Malley’s unlawful actions and the 
arrests.133 
When the plaintiffs appealed to the First Circuit, the court began by 
reiterating that a magistrate’s approval of a warrant did not prevent a jury’s 
review of probable cause.134  The court stated that “judicial imprimatur is [not] 
an impregnable shield against any attack on the sufficiency of the underlying 
affidavit”135 because that “is unquestionably bootstrapping.”136  The court 
relied on Harlow v. Fitzgerald’s137 test for qualified immunity in civil rights 
cases, which is whether the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable.138  
The First Circuit found Harlow’s test replaced the torts subjective good 
faith/malice standards that had been transplanted into civil rights law.139 
The court reasoned that allowing magistrates to shield officers from 
liability would encourage sloppy police work and the burden of protecting 
people from unlawful arrests should not fall squarely on the intermediary.140  
Ultimately, the court placed liability from arrests lacking probable cause on 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Briggs v. Malley, 748 F.2d 715, 716–17 (1st Cir. 1984), aff’d, 475 U.S. 335 (1986). 
 130. Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (“[I]f the facts supporting 
an arrest are put before an intermedia[ry] such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermedia[ry]’s 
decision breaks the casual chain and insulates an initiating party.”). 
 131. Smith v. Gonzales, 670 F.2d 522, 526 (5th Cir. 1982) (specifying that an intermediary’s 
actions, which break the causal chain, include issuing a warrant or returning an indictment), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 1137 (1983). 
 132. Briggs, 748 F.2d at 717. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 716–17 (referencing B.R.C. Transport Co. v. Fontaine, 727 F.2d 7, 10 n.1 (1st Cir. 1984)). 
 135. Id. at 717 (quoting Fontaine, 727 F.2d at 10 n.1.) 
 136. Fontaine, 727 F.2d at 10 n.1. 
 137. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“We therefore hold that government officials performing 
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.”). 
 138. Briggs, 748 F.2d at 721 (“Applying the standard of official immunity enunciated in Harlow, 
we hold that only where an officer is ‘constitutionally negligent,’ that is, where the officer should have 
known that the facts recited in the affidavit did not constitute probable cause, will liability attach.”). 
 139. Id. at 718. 
 140. Id. at 720. 
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officers.141  Several policy reasons supported the court’s ruling: 1) personal 
liability would deter officers from making unlawful arrests; 2) officers and 
agencies would be more likely to adopt remedial measures if they were held 
liable for negligent arrests; 3) fewer and less substantial constitutional 
violations would occur if remedies included monetary damages; and 4) 
plaintiffs deserved a remedy for civil rights violations.142 
The First Circuit strongly criticized the Fifth Circuit’s causation rule: 
The “chain of causation” theory does not withstand scrutiny.  If we 
use the tort concept of “but for” cause to determine when a causal 
connection is present, it seems clear that “but for” the police officer’s 
submission of the warrant to the magistrate, the warrant would not 
issue and the search or arrest would not occur.  It is the decision of 
the police officer to bring the matter to the magistrate that is the active 
cause of the search or arrest.  Where that decision is the result of 
negligence, [i.e.], failure to exercise a modicum of judgment about 
the presence of probable cause, that negligence is the cause of the 
improper search or arrest.143 
The First Circuit ruled in favor of James and Louisa Briggs, and Malley 
appealed to the Supreme Court.144  The Supreme Court observed that although 
§ 1983 includes no immunities to suit, an official may have one if he can 
identify a common law immunity defense from tort actions available when the 
Civil Rights Act became law in 1871.145  The Court declared it is the officials 
who carry the burden of demonstrating that public policy requires immunity 
be given to them.146 
The Court then examined Malley’s argument, an argument lifted from the 
Rodriguez court’s legal analysis:147 Malley claimed he was analogous to the 
historical layperson—referenced in Rodriguez’s secondary sources148—
 
 141. Id. at 719–20. 
 142. Id. at 720. 
 143. Id. at 721. 
 144. Id. at 721; Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339 (1986). 
 145. Malley, 475 U.S. at 339–40. 
 146. Id. at 340. 
 147. See Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (analyzing whether 
the plaintiff stated a claim for relief under federal common law and holding that she could not avail 
herself of “any type of common law remedy, federal or otherwise”). 
 148. Id. at 1193 n.34 (describing the common law liability standard for a layperson who has given 
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seeking an arrest.149  The Court rejected his argument because historically, 
complainants were not protected from suit if they acted maliciously or without 
probable cause because the result of their actions were foreseeable.150  
Moreover, historically, malice had always been an issue for the jury to 
decide.151  The Court, agreeing with the First Circuit,152 said Harlow’s 
objective reasonableness standard applied to these circumstances.153  It 
cautioned federal courts to exercise restraint when assessing immunity: “We 
reemphasize that our role is to interpret the intent of Congress in enacting 
§ 1983, not to make a freewheeling policy choice, and that we are guided in 
interpreting Congress’[s] intent by the common[]law tradition.”154  The Court 
found that qualified immunity was accorded to defendants in 1871,155 the 
Harlow standard ensured officers would be cautious when applying for a 
warrant,156 damages imposed the cost on the party responsible for the 
constitutional tort, and victims of constitutional torts deserved a remedy.157  
The Court also found that premature requests for warrants wasted judicial 
resources and led to unlawful arrests of innocent people.158 
In conclusion, the Court held the Harlow standard applied.159  While 
Malley did not pursue his First Circuit court argument that the judge’s 
decision broke the causal chain, the Supreme Court nevertheless addressed 
the argument’s soundness.160  The Court stated that “[i]t should be clear, 
 
information to the police about the commission of a crime). 
 149. Malley, 475 U.S. at 340. 
 150. Id. at 340–41. 
 151. Id. at 341. 
 152. See Briggs v. Malley, 748 F.2d 715, 718 (1st Cir. 1984) (applying the objective reasonableness 
standard to police officers for § 1983 purposes), aff’d, 475 U.S. 335 (1986). 
 153. Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. 
 154. Id. at 342. 
 155. Id. at 341. (“Given malice and the lack of probable cause, the complainant enjoyed no 
immunity.”). 
 156. Id. at 343. 
 157. Id. at 344. 
 158. Id. at 343–44. 
 159. Id. at 344–45. 
 160. Id. at 344  n.7.  Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion in Malley, also questioned the 
doctrine in a 1982 dissent to a denial of certiorari.  Smith v. Gonzales, 459 U.S.1005, 1005–06 (1982) 
(White, J., dissenting).  In that dissent, Justice White said the doctrine conflicted with the rule in three 
other circuit courts.  Id. at 1006.  And he questioned the strength of the decision in Rodriguez v. 
Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), due to its plurality status and the fact that there were 
three distinct opinions written by the Fifth Circuit justices who decided the case.  Smith, 459 U.S. at 
1006. 
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however, that the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s ‘no causation’ rationale in this case is 
inconsistent with our interpretation of § 1983 . . . [because] § 1983 ‘should be 
read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for 
the natural consequences of his actions.”161  The Court reasoned that because 
the common law acknowledged a causal link between the issuance of a 
complaint and an arrest, § 1983 recognized a causal link between the officer’s 
actions and the arrest.162 Again, the traditional civil rights causation principle 
was proximate cause, not the Fifth Circuit’s novel causation approach. 
This is the part of the story where the Fifth Circuit abandons its doctrine 
following Malley’s clear rejection of it.  The Malley opinion was released in 
1986.163  In 1987, the Fifth Circuit decided United States v. Burzynski Cancer 
Research Institute, which addressed constitutional tort claims, immunity 
standards, alleged civil rights violations stemming from an unlawful search, 
and most importantly, the independent intermediary doctrine.164  The 
Burzynski analysis of the constitutional tort claims began by referencing the 
qualified immunity standard set out in Harlow, which is the objectively 
reasonable standard Malley endorsed.165  Importantly, the court read 
Burzynski’s complaint about the warrant as if the pleadings were true: that the 
federal government sought and executed the warrant in order to put Burzynski 
out of business.166 
The court then addressed the defendant’s argument that the warrant was 
issued after a federal magistrate signed it, so the magistrate cut off any malice 
or lack of probable cause.167  This is what the Fifth Circuit said in reply to the 
defendant’s argument: “Dr. Burzynski counters by correctly pointing out that 
the Supreme Court rejected the rationale underlying that broadly-stated rule 
in Malley v. Briggs.”168  The court then determined that nowhere in 
Burzynski’s claim did he allege the warrant lacked probable cause or 
contained omissions or false statements, and thus, Burzynski failed to 
establish the federal agents who obtained the search warrant violated any 
 
 161. Malley, 475 U.S. at 344 n.7 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), overruled on 
other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of. Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Malley, 475 U.S. at 344. 
 164. 819 F.2d 1301, 1308–11 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 165. Id. at 1309. 
 166. Id. at 1309–10. 
 167. Id. at 1309. 
 168. Id. (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 & n.7 (1986)). 
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constitutional rights.169  The Burzynski case is important because it 
acknowledged Malley’s repudiation of the doctrine; the court dutifully 
followed the Harlow and Malley standards.  However, the Fifth Circuit’s 
obedience to the Supreme Court would be short-lived. 
This is the part of the story where the doctrine is resurrected from the 
dead.  One year after Burzynski, the Fifth Circuit decided Hand v. Gary,170 
which is easily the most cited of the independent intermediary doctrine 
cases.171  Hand involved a stolen truck, a plaintiff who tried to extort money 
from the truck’s owner, and a state and federal criminal investigation into the 
plaintiff’s act.172  State prosecutors dismissed indictments obtained against 
Hand, the plaintiff, who then sued the truck’s owner and law enforcement 
agents under § 1983.173  While Hand’s civil complaint was pending, a federal 
prosecutor indicted and tried Hand, but the jury acquitted him.174  Hand won 
his § 1983 suit and the original investigating officer, Gary, appealed.175 
The Fifth Circuit said it had two questions to resolve: (1) whether Gary’s 
pursuit of a criminal case after he learned Hand was suing him for civil rights 
violations was an act of malicious prosecution; and (2) whether Gary falsely 
arrested Hand.176  While Hand alleged Gary pursued the federal indictment to 
shield himself from civil liability,177 Gary rebutted this allegation by showing 
that the last indictment was based upon the federal prosecutor’s independent 
investigation of the case.178 
The Hand court stated that in malicious prosecution cases, once the 
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
 
 169. Id. at 1309–10. 
 170. 838 F.2d 1420 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 171. It has been cited by ten other circuits and by hundreds of district court cases.  E.g., Small v. 
McCrystal, 708 F.3d 997, 1006 (8th Cir. 2013); Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 648 (4th Cir. 2012); 
Moore v. Hartman, 571 F.3d 62, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 
1067 (9th Cir. 2004); Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 2004); Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 
F.3d 342, 351 (2d Cir. 2000); Aronson v. City of Akron, 116 F.3d 804, 813 (6th Cir. 1997); Felix de 
Santana v. Velez, 956 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1992); Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1196 (11th Cir. 
1989); Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 172. Hand, 838 F.2d at 1422–23. 
 173. Id. at 1423. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 1424. 
 177. Id. at 1426 (“Plaintiff alleged that [the officer] and others had caused the third criminal 
indictment to issue simply to gain leverage in a civil suit . . . .”). 
 178. Id. at 1427. 
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show his actions were not improperly motivated because he did not impact 
the prosecution or act with malice.179  The court found that Gary met his 
burden because he withheld no evidence from the federal agents, “probable 
cause was reascertained,” proper procedures were followed, and he testified 
truthfully before the grand jury.180 
On the false arrest claim, the Hand court sought to harmonize its 
precedent with Judge Hill’s concurrence in Rodriguez.181  Judge Hill did not 
want to send a message that a grand jury immunizes officers and prosecutors 
from malicious acts or bad faith.182  Consequently, the Hand court held that 
the chain of causation is broken only where all the facts are presented 
to the grand jury, where the malicious motive of the law enforcement 
officials does not lead them to withhold any relevant information . . . 
from the independent intermediary.  Any misdirection of the 
magistrate or the grand jury by omission or commission perpetuates 
the taint of the original official behavior.183 
Again, the court concluded that “Gary withheld no information from the 
federal agents, . . .  prosecutors[,] . . . or from the federal grand jury,” so he 
was immune from suit.184 
Significantly, Hand never referenced Malley or the Harlow standard 
Malley endorsed.  It is as if the panel deciding Hand in 1988 was unaware of 
the Malley decision from 1986, even though the Fifth Circuit acknowledged 
it and the independent intermediary doctrine’s demise in Burzynski in 1987.185  
Was the Fifth Circuit being willfully disobedient?  Or was the Hand panel 
negligent in keeping up with legal developments and binding precedent?  
There are no other valid explanations for the doctrine’s resurgence.  If the 
court did not think Malley applied, it would have distinguished the case on the 
facts like appellate courts frequently do. 
This is the part of the story when the Fifth Circuit gets overly defensive 
about the doctrine and uses slippery language to denigrate Malley.  In 2005, 
 
 179. Id. at 1426. 
 180. Id. at 1427. 
 181. Id. at 1427–28. 
 182. Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1194–95 (Hill, J., concurring). 
 183. Hand, 838 F.2d at 1427–28. 
 184. Id. at 1428. 
 185. United States v. Burzynski Cancer Research Inst., 819 F.2d 1301, 1309 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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the Fifth Circuit tried to explain the Malley-Burzynski-Hand debacle in 
Murray v. Earle.186  It began by claiming that the Malley Court merely 
“intimated” in dicta that the doctrine was inconsistent with § 1983, the Court’s 
decision in Monroe v. Pape, and tort liability in general,187 even though the 
Supreme Court stated it wanted to make its rejection “clear” to a district court 
that had specifically relied upon the independent intermediary doctrine 
created by Rodriguez and Smith.188 
The Fifth Circuit then said it only “implicitly endorsed” the Supreme 
Court’s suggestions in Burzynski when it held that Malley required its 
repudiation of the doctrine.189  The Murray court implied that because Hand’s 
holding was “qualified” and “consistent with other circuit precedent,” it was 
legitimate, even though it never mentioned Malley or Burzynski in the 
opinion.190  The “circuit precedent” the Fifth Circuit relied on was its own, 
including Rodriguez and Smith, which were discounted as illogical and 
inconsistent by the First Circuit and Supreme Court decisions; all three 
decisions the Fifth Circuit cited predated Malley and thus were overruled by 
Malley.191  In sum, this 2005 Fifth Circuit decision was trying to rewrite 
history by upholding a doctrine Malley said had no place in civil rights law, 
and by suggesting that the very cases the Supreme Court found unpersuasive 
were actually credible after all.192 
The Murray court went on to describe the causation rule as one that “has 
since prevailed in this circuit for almost two decades.”193  It considered 
Burzynski a momentary contradiction that failed to discuss its reasoning in 
depth, and thus the Fifth Circuit was “unwilling to disregard firmly ensconced 
circuit precedent in favor of such a cursory analysis of Malley’s dicta.”194  
Although the court recognized doctrine “tension” among the circuits, it 
ultimately held that in the present case, which involved officers unlawfully 
taking a juvenile’s confession in violation of the Fifth Amendment, the state 
 
 186. 405 F.3d 278, 291 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 187. Id.  
 188. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344  n.7 (1986). 
 189. Murray, 405 F.3d at 291. 
 190. Id. at 291–92. 
 191. Id. at 291 n.49. 
 192. Id. at 291; Malley, 475 U.S. at 344 n.7. 
 193. Murray, 405 F.3d at 292. 
 194. Id. 
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judge acted as a neutral intermediary.195  For now, this is the end of the 
doctrine’s development story. 
B. The Doctrine’s Independent Intermediaries 
The Fifth Circuit has said the focus of the causation doctrine is on the 
independent decision maker who is able “to impartially and objectively 
evaluate the underlying facts and . . . reach its own decision.”196  This 
hypothetical decision maker could be a judge, magistrate, justice of the peace, 
prosecutor, grand jury, or petit jury.197  Though the people who occupy these 
roles may be charged with finding probable cause, determining whether an 
arrest was lawful, or deciding guilt or innocence, not all are in fact neutral or 
independent.  They have disparate knowledge about criminal law and 
procedure, and not all are charged with making wholly independent decisions.  
While many courts theorize these intermediaries are equal and completely 
independent, some courts recognize they are not.198  Consider what one district 
court said about the prosecutor and judge in a case where defendants tried to 
claim the doctrine: 
The prosecutor who controls the reasons for dismissal set out in his 
motion is obviously not a neutral impartial intermediary, and the 
judge may not be sufficiently informed about the facts of the arrest, 
as required to break the chain of causality.  There is no indication that 
the particular facts of the arrest were put before the judge in the 
instant case, no less that there was a “full and fair presentation of the 
facts.”199 
 
 195. Id. at 292–93. 
 196. Morris v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657, 673 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 197. E.g., Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1195 (11th Cir. 1989) (explaining that intervening acts 
could result from a “prosecutor, grand jury, judge, and jury”); Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 943 
(7th Cir. 1972) (explaining sentencing as “a discretionary function of the trial judge”); Rollins v. 
Hattiesburg Police Dep’t, No. 2:14CV61-KS-MTP, 2015 WL 4276386, at *9 (S.D. Miss. July 14, 
2015) (identifying the trial judge as the independent intermediary). 
 198. See Judge Paul L. Friedman, Threats to Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law, A.B.A.: 
Section of Litigation Committee on the American Judicial System (Nov. 18, 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/initiatives/committee-on-american-judicial-system/in-
the-news/threats-to-judicial-independence-and-rule-of-law/. 
 199. Goodarzi v. Hartzog, No. Civ. A. H-12-2870, 2013 WL 3110056, at *20 (S.D. Tex. June 14, 
2013). 
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Several courts see gradations of independence among the intermediaries.  
While the Supreme Court has stated that “the decision whether or not to 
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests 
entirely” with the prosecutor,200 not all prosecutors make independent 
decisions.201  The Fifth Circuit cannot decide whether prosecutors are 
independent intermediaries.202  For example, in one opinion, the court said 
prosecutors “are not . . . ‘impartial intermediar[ies]’ capable of insulating an 
officer from liability”; rather, they are “inherently biased part[ies].”203  
However, three years earlier, the Fifth Circuit held a prosecutor was an 
independent intermediary.204  Other Fifth Circuit and district court opinions 
have concluded they are not.205  This is one of many inconsistencies with the 
doctrine and its application. 
Federal courts have questioned whether magistrates are independent 
intermediaries.206  In Malley, the Supreme Court recognized that “ours is not 
an ideal system, and it is possible that a magistrate, working under docket 
pressures, will fail to perform as a magistrate should.”207  An Iowa district 
court found this true when it determined a magistrate failed to catch that the 
warrant affidavit erroneously relied on a statute because the officers carelessly 
read the law.208  The truth is omissions, malice, and shoddy work sometimes 
make their way to an overworked, distracted, lazy, incompetent, or unethical 
intermediary.209  The doctrine, however, presumes that all intermediaries are 
 
 200. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). 
 201. See, e.g., Goodarzi, 2013 WL 3110056 at *20 (determining a prosecutor was not independent).  
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a unique rule when it comes to prosecutors.  There is a presumption 
that the prosecutor exercised independent discretion in making the charging decision that can be 
rebutted only when the plaintiff establishes the officers influenced or pressured the prosecutor to seek 
charges.  See Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266–-67 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 202. Compare Cuadra v. Houst. Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 813–14 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding a 
prosecutor was independent), with Russell v. Altom, 546 F. App’x 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2013) (stating 
prosecutors are not impartial intermediaries). 
 203. Russell, 546 F. App’x at 437 . 
 204. Cuadra, 626 F.3d at 813–14. 
 205. E.g., Hale v. Fish, 899 F.2d 390, 401 (5th Cir. 1990) (explaining that “an assistant district 
attorney is not an ‘impartial intermediary’ under Hand”); Goodarzi, 2013 WL 3110056 at *20 (holding 
that prosecutors are not impartial intermediaries). 
 206. See e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345–46 (1986); Baldwin v. Estherville, Iowa, 218 F. 
Supp. 3d 987, 1003 (N.D. Iowa 2016). 
 207. Malley, 475 U.S. at 345–46. 
 208. Baldwin, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 1003. 
 209. See generally Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How 
Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U.L. REV. 261, 262–97 
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wholly independent, attentive, honest, and hard-working folks.  Most cases 
cite Hand’s standard without considering the adjective “independent,” 
focusing instead on the word “intermediary,” as if the role the person occupies 
is enough to insulate officers from liability for their constitutional torts.210 
One sees any number of intermediary scenarios play out in these cases.  
Typically, when one person acts maliciously or assumes multiple 
intermediary roles, courts find for the plaintiff.211  When there were multiple 
intermediaries involved, however, courts favor defendants.212  Some courts try 
in earnest to carefully assess the independence of the intermediary.213  In one 
 
(2011) (explaining how common it is for prosecutors to be overworked and the harms defendants 
experience when prosecutors are overworked). 
 210. E.g., Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 291–92 (5th Cir. 2005) (reaffirming the Hand standard 
due to its deep entrenchment in “circuit precedent”). 
 211. E.g., White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956, 957, 961–62 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding no immunity for 
officers who acted with malice and assumed roles of complaining witnesses, arrest warrant affiants, 
grand jury witnesses, hearing witnesses, and trial witnesses); Thomas v. Sams, 734 F.2d 185, 187, 
189–92 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding for the plaintiff where a bad actor played the role of complaining 
witness, magistrate authoring and signing the arrest warrant, and judge who deliberately sought not to 
get an independent intermediary involved and, thus, could not immunize his malicious conduct); 
Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 852 (5th Cir. 1981) (deeming defendant judge’s actions unlawful 
where he “acted as complaining witness, prosecutor, factfinder, and judge”). 
 212. E.g., Armstrong v. Asselin, 734 F.3d 984, 994 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Officers Asselin and 
Vandegriff consulted with six prosecutors and obtained warrants from five judicial officials.  As 
[Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535 (2012)] holds, we would have to treat all eleven 
prosecutors and judges as ‘plainly incompetent’ to deny Officer Asselin and the other officers qualified 
immunity.”); Allen v. Jackson Cty., Civ. No. 1:12-CV-57-HSO-RHW, 2014 WL 940270, at *10 (S.D. 
Miss. March 11, 2014) (finding for the defendant where three different judges and a grand jury acted 
as independent intermediaries); Berry v. Bennett, No. 3:10-CV-2160-D BK, 2010 WL 5464879, at *4 
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2010) (finding for the defendant where both the judge and the grand jury 
independently determined probable cause); Causey v. Par. of Tangipahoa, 167 F. Supp. 2d 898, 906 
(E.D. La. 2001) (“[I]ndependent persons or bodies made four findings of probable cause as to 
plaintiff’s involvement with the crime, three after he confessed.”).  
 213. E.g., Collins v. Doyle, 209 F.3d 719, at *5 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he district attorney’s office had 
complete discretion to decide whether to initiate and pursue charges . . . .”); Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 
154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000) (Nygaard, J., concurring) (determining that the magistrate’s independent 
judgment was not compromised); Eubanks v. Gerwen, 40 F.3d 1157, 1160–61 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(finding that the prosecutor was given all information by officers and made an independent decision 
to go forward with the case); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 193–94 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (remanding 
the case to the trial court to decide, among other things, whether the prosecutor’s decision to charge 
the plaintiffs was made without influence or pressure from the police chief); Smith v. Tullis, No. 5:15-
CV-493-DAE, 2016 WL 6634948, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2016) (deciding the county attorney “is 
not sufficiently autonomous” under these facts, so he could not be deemed an independent 
intermediary); Arceneaux v. La., Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. Civ. 04-1033, 2008 WL 2369188, at *4 
(W.D. La. June 10, 2008) (analyzing carefully all of the documents and findings of the judge and 
comparing them to the warrant affidavit to determine the judge heard all of the facts and made an 
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district court opinion, the judge emphasized repeatedly that the investigating 
officers and prosecutor were wholly independent from the influence of the 
arresting officer.214  In another decision, the judge stressed that the prosecutor 
accepted charges without any influence by the civil defendants after she 
considered both exculpatory and inculpatory evidence and presented all of the 
facts to a grand jury, which indicted the plaintiff twice.215  But careful analysis 
in these opinions is the exception, not the rule. 
C. The Doctrine’s Unclear Burden-Shifting Framework 
Hand was the first court to address, in part, who carries the burden of 
proof in civil rights cases.216  For malicious prosecution, once the plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to show his 
conduct did not impact the prosecution or she did not act with malice.217  The 
burden of proof for false arrest, however, is much less clear.218  The Hand 
court spoke in terms of taint evidence and presenting versus omitting evidence 
necessary to determine probable cause.219  Because Hand left a lot unclear, 
courts are inconsistent about who carries the burden and what that burden even 
is.220  As a result, the burden is mostly whatever courts want it to be.  This 
section will address cases that rule the defendant carries the burden, cases that 
rule the plaintiff carries the burden, the numerous burdens articulated by 
courts, and the unreasonable burden courts have determined plaintiffs must 
meet. 
 
independent decision); Rhodes v. Smithers, 939 F. Supp. 1256, 1277–78 (S.D.W. Va. 1995), 
(concluding, after careful consideration, that the prosecutor “made an independent decision to proceed 
before the grand jury”), aff’d, 91 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 214. Cherry v. Garner, No. Civ.A. 03-CV-01696, 2004 WL 3019241, at *9 n.19, *10. (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 30, 2004). 
 215. Cuadra v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. CV H-07-3300, 2009 WL 10703694, at *9 (S.D. Tex. 
Aug. 17, 2009), aff’d, 626 F.3d 808 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 216. Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1426 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 217. Id. at 1426–27. 
 218. Id. at 1427–28. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 1428.  Compare Shields v. Twiss, 389 F.3d 142, 147–48 (5th Cir. 2004) (suggesting that, 
in false arrest cases, the burden of evidence is first placed on the defendant), with Taylor v. Gregg, 36 
F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that, to meet their burden in false arrest cases, the plaintiff must 
show that an intermediary actually relied on false information). 
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1. The Defendant Carries the Burden 
One 2019 Fifth Circuit opinion held that the defendant must prove they 
presented the intermediary with all of the evidence or the doctrine does not 
apply.221  One 2004 Fifth Circuit decision held the plaintiff failed to rebut the 
defendants’ testimony, which suggests the burden of evidence begins with the 
defendant.222  District courts in Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas have also 
suggested the burden of evidence in these cases rests with defendants.223  
Another Fifth Circuit decision stated the defendants had the burden of 
pleading the doctrine, but they waived it.224  In 2018, a Texas district court 
held that the burden of establishing that the causal link was broken by an 
intermediary rested with defendants.225  Finally, in three recent Texas and 
Mississippi district court decisions, the courts held the defendants must prove 
with direct evidence that an independent intermediary actually found probable 
cause before they may lay claim to the doctrine.226  None of those courts were 
satisfied with the defendants’ evidence.227 
2. The Plaintiff Carries the Burden 
Although there are more cases that suggest the burden of evidence rests 
with plaintiffs, the specific burden differs, perhaps reflecting the stage of the 
proceedings, or possibly revealing the merits of the plaintiff’s case or the 
 
 221. Winfrey v. Johnson, 766 F. App’x 66, 71 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 377 (mem.) 
(2019) (“[I]t is [the Defendant’s] burden to prove the omitted material information was presented to 
the judge.  He has not done so.”). 
 222. Shields, 389 F.3d at 148. 
 223. E.g., Farmer v. Lawson, 510 F. Supp. 91, 96 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (“The questions for the fact-
finder are whether the sheriffs knew or should have known that the search warrant was invalid and 
whether the sheriffs acted in good faith in securing the search warrant.  The burden of proof is on the 
defendants to demonstrate that their actions were taken in good faith.”) (citing Douthit v. Jones, 619 
F.2d 527, 533–34 (5th Cir. 1980); Skehan v. Bd. of Trs. of Bloomburg State Coll., 538 F.2d 53, 61–
62 (3d Cir. 1976))). 
 224. Scribner v. Dillard, 141 F. App’x 240, 242–44 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 225. Cook v. City of Tyler, No. 6:17-CV-00333-RWS, 2018 WL 4473110, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 
18, 2018). 
 226. Sinegal v. City of El Paso, 414 F. Supp. 3d 995, 1002–03 (W.D. Tex. 2019); Holcomb v. 
McGraw, 262 F. Supp. 3d 437, 452 n.4 (W.D. Tex. 2017); Keith v. Schuh, No. CIV. A. 1:96CV39-D-
D, 1997 WL 457487, at *7 n.6 (N.D. Miss. July 14, 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 157 F.3d 900 (5th 
Cir. 1998). 
 227. Sinegal, 414 F. Supp. 3d at 1011; Holcomb, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 452; Keith, 1997 WL 457487, 
at *14. 
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mood of the judge.228  These burdens are included here from the most onerous 
to the least.  Some Fifth Circuit cases, along with some Texas and Mississippi 
trial court cases, state the plaintiff has to affirmatively show the intermediary 
actually relied upon false information.229  Other courts hold the plaintiff has 
to offer evidence of taint.230  Several Fifth Circuit and Texas trial opinions 
hold the plaintiff must prove tainted evidence was presented to the 
intermediary.231  Yet other Fifth Circuit and trial court opinions have held that 
the plaintiff has to allege facts that raise a plausible claim or reasonable 
 
 228. Compare Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the plaintiff must 
show that an intermediary actually relied on false information to meet their burden), with Wooten v. 
Roach, 431 F. Supp. 3d 875, 897 (E.D. Tex. 2019) (holding plaintiffs in false arrest cases to a lesser 
burden by only requiring them to present evidence that raises a plausible claim or reasonable inference 
that the intermediaries’ decisions were tainted), and McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682, 690–91 (5th Cir. 
2017) (ruling that plaintiffs must only show evidence that the defendants tainted the intermediaries’ 
deliberation to meet their burden). 
 229. See Taylor, 36 F.3d at 456–57; Furlow v. Baker, No. 6:18-CV-00127-RWS, 2019 WL 
1984142, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2019); Newsome v. Mississippi, No. 1:18cv178-HSO-RHW, 2018 
WL 3876585, at *3–4 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 15, 2018), appeal dismissed, 788 Fed. App’x. 958 (5th Cir. 
Dec. 24, 2019); Rollins v. Hattiesburg Police Dep’t, No. 2:14CV61-KS-MTP, 2015 WL 4276386, at 
*8–9 (S.D. Miss. July 14, 2015); Allen v. Jackson Cty., No. 1:12-cv-57-HSO-RHW, 2014 WL 940270, 
at *11 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 11, 2014); McAllister v. Desoto Cty., No. 2:09CV163-SA-DAS, 2011 WL 
2516260, at *5 (N.D. Miss. June 23, 2011), aff’d, 470 F. App’x 313 (5th Cir. 2012); Reynolds v. 
Strayhorn, No. A-05-CA-638 LY, 2006 WL 3341030, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2006); Taylor-Hill 
v. Keyes, No. Civ. A. 204CV40-MTP, 2006 WL 3231962, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 7, 2006). 
 230. See Buehler v. City of Austin/Austin Police Dep’t, 824 F.3d 548, 554–55 (5th Cir. 2016); 
Spivey v. Robertson, 32 F. App’x 127 at *1 (5th Cir. 2002); Lake-Crunk v. City of Hous. Police Dep’t, 
No. CV H-18-1113, 2018 WL 2337136, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 22, 2018); Lomas v. Par. of Ascension, 
No. CV 16-00645-BAJ-RLB, 2017 WL 3929305, at *5 (M.D. La. Sept. 7, 2017); Hagan v. Jackson, 
No. 1:13CV268-HSO-RHW, 2014 WL 4914801, at *9 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 30, 2014); Cook v. Perkins, 
No. Civ. A. 12-258-SCR, 2013 WL 5720327, at *8 (M.D. La. Oct. 21, 2013), aff’d sub nom. Cook v. 
Graves, 575 F. App’x 505 (5th Cir. 2014); Chisolm v. DeSoto Police Dep’t, No. 3:12-CV-5025-M, 
2013 WL 5190886, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2013); Davis v. City of Shinnston, No. 1:12CV53, 2013 
WL 4805814, at *8–9 (N.D.W. Va. Sept. 9, 2013); Dumans v. Fort Bend Cty., No. Civ. A. 4:08-CV-
01359, 2009 WL 7808946, at *5 (S.D. Tex. June 29, 2009); Trois v. Long, No. A-07-CA-965-SS, 
2008 WL 11409933, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2008), aff’d, 362 F. App’x 399 (5th Cir. 2010); Goldyn 
v. Clark Cty., No. 2:06-CV-0950-RCJ-RJJ, 2007 WL 2592797, at *6 (D. Nev. Aug. 31, 2007), aff’d, 
346 F. App’x 153 (9th Cir. 2009); Maier v. Green, 485 F. Supp. 2d 711, 720 (W.D. La. 2007); Barker 
v. McBride, No. Civ. A. 00-1623, 2002 WL 575694, at *2–5 (E.D. La. Apr. 16, 2002). 
 231. See Lock v. Torres, 694 F. App’x 960, 964 (5th Cir. 2017); Jennings v. Patton, 644 F.3d 297, 
301 (5th Cir. 2011); Marshall v. Austin City Police Dep’t, No. A-18-CV-410-LY, 2018 WL 5018484, 
at *4 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2018); Glaster v. City of Mansfield, No. 14-627, 2015 WL 852412, at *7 
(W.D. La. Feb. 26, 2015); Bryant v. Oaks, No. 2:13CV00022, 2014 WL 7330787, at *5 (W.D. Va. 
Dec. 19, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Bryant v. Carico, 616 F. App’x 84 (4th Cir. 2015); Sullivan v. Boyd 
Tunica, Inc., No. Civ. A. 206CV016-B-A, 2007 WL 541619, at *5 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 16, 2007); Morgan 
v. City of Waco, No. 3-01-CV-2818-K, 2003 WL 21640563, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. July 9, 2003), 
amended by No. 3-01-CV-2818-K, 2003 WL 21653869, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 11, 2003).  
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inference that there was no probable cause or that the intermediary’s decision 
was tainted.232  The most commonly espoused burden—suggested by the Fifth 
Circuit and district courts in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi—merely 
requires plaintiffs to plead defendants tainted the intermediary’s 
deliberations.233  However, in rare cases when the plaintiff wins, the Fifth 
Circuit and Texas district courts have excused insufficient pleadings.234 
Another aspect that varies is whether the appellate court views the 
pleadings in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.235  For example, the Fifth 
Circuit and district courts in Louisiana and Texas have assumed the plaintiff’s 
 
 232. See Shaw v. Villanueva, 918 F.3d 414, 416 (5th Cir. 2019) (describing the standard to survive 
a motion to dismiss); Wooten, 431 F. Supp. 3d at 897 (stating that the plaintiffs met the burden with 
plausible allegations that the facts and law presented to intermediaries were incomplete); Hagwood v. 
Doe, No. 3:16-CV-3038-G-BN, 2018 WL 1833053, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2018), report and 
recommendation adopted by No. 3:16-CV-3038-G-BN, 2018 WL 1813152 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2018); 
Republic Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Charles, No. CV 17-5967, 2018 WL 310378, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 5, 
2018); McGee v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 3:17-CV-438-M-BN, 2017 WL 4325790, at *5 (N.D. 
Tex. Aug. 28, 2017); Brodnik v. Lanham, No. CV 1:11-0178, 2016 WL 4087361, at *6–7 (S.D.W. 
Va. Aug. 1, 2016); Smith v. Mursura, No. A-15-CA-1017-SS, 2015 WL 13730830, at *2 (W.D. Tex. 
Dec. 29, 2015); Tilmon v. Texas, No. A-14-CA-499-SS, 2015 WL 1292269, at *10 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 
23, 2015); Spease v. Cooper, No. 1:12-CV-371, 2014 WL 526142, at *13 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2014). 
 233. See Curtis v. Sowell, 761 F. App’x 302, 305 (5th Cir. 2019); McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682, 
689–90 (5th Cir. 2017); Jordan v. Brumfield, 687 F. App’x 408, 416 (5th Cir. 2017); Deville v. 
Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 170 (5th Cir. 2009); Villegas v. City of El Paso, No. EP-15-CV-00386-FM, 
2020 WL 981878, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2020); Abdullah v. Texas, No. A-18-CA-1076-LY, 2019 
WL 981942, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2019); Willis v. Bastrop Cty., No. A-18-CV-0093-RP, 2019 
WL 252051, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2019); Thorpe v. WMS Gaming, Inc., No. 3:16CV00147-NBB-
RP, 2018 WL 4621906 at *4 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 26, 2018); Buehler v. City of Austin, No. 1:17-CV-
724-LY, 2018 WL 4225046, at *2–4 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2018) (stating that plaintiff only needs to 
raise a plausible claim in his pleadings); Finley v. Griffin, No. 5:17-CV-136-BQ, 2018 WL 10626249, 
at *3–4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2018); Binning v. Bally Gaming, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-00146-NBB-RP, 
2018 WL 296782, at *4–5 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 4, 2018); Alexander v. Crozier, No. A-15-CA-544-RP, 
2016 WL 676480, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2016); Jordan v. City of New Orleans, No. CV 15-1922, 
2016 WL 633666, at *7 (E.D. La. Feb. 17, 2016), aff’d sub nom. Jordan v. Brumfield, 687 F. App’x 
408 (5th Cir. 2017); Richardson v. Hunt Cty., No. 3:09-CV-2342-K, 2010 WL 1779409, at *2 n.2 
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2010), report and recommendation adopted by No. 3:09-CV-2342-K, 2010 WL 
1779403 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2010); Culpepper v. Williams, No. Civ. A. 1:06CV125LGJM, 2007 WL 
2406970, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 20, 2007); Calhoun v. City of Austin, No. A-06-CA-185 AA, 2007 
WL 9700763, at *3–4 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2007). 
 234. See Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483, 491 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. 
Winfrey, 139 S. Ct. 1549 (2019); Fields v. Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., No. 4:16-CV-607-ALM-
CAN, 2017 WL 9285416, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2017). 
 235. Compare McLin, 866 F.3d at 688 (viewing the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 
defendant), with Anderson v. Flemming, No. 3:16CV37-DPJ-FKB, 2017 WL 2380249, at *2 (S.D. 
Miss. May 31, 2017) (viewing the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). 
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facts are true.236  But the Fifth Circuit has also said that when there are 
“different interpretations” of facts from the plaintiff and defendant or 
“inconsistencies,” this is not enough to establish actual taint.237  This is 
particularly concerning given the fact that the Supreme Court has stated that 
in civil rights cases, the courts must view the facts in the complaint as true.238 
Even if all of these cases suggest the plaintiff has the burden, what that 
burden actually requires the plaintiff to prove or plead is unclear.  As a result, 
plaintiffs have no idea what to expect in district court or on appeal, which 
poses a notice problem when they are deciding whether to file suit. 
3. An Impossible Burden for Plaintiffs 
If the plaintiff is required to carry the burden, the burden courts have 
articulated is frankly impossible to meet.239  Courts have expected plaintiffs 
to produce evidence they cannot access or evidence with no available 
record.240  The Supreme Court has recognized that it is rare that a prosecutor 
reveals retaliatory thinking or that he acted as a rubber stamp, and it would be 
“unrealistic to expect a prosecutor to reveal his mind” when deciding to seek 
an indictment.241  Yet, some courts expect the plaintiff to prove that the 
intermediary relied upon tainted evidence.242  Plaintiffs have stated in the 
plainest way possible they cannot produce evidence that is inaccessible or that 
 
 236. See McLin, 866 F.3d at 690–91, 695; United States v. Burzynski Cancer Research Inst., 819 
F.2d 1301, 1309–10 (5th Cir. 1987); Ferguson v. Dunn, No. 1:16-CV-272, 2017 WL 9286964, at *4 
(E.D. Tex. May 19, 2017), report and recommendation adopted by No. 1:16-CV-272, 2017 WL 
2728631, at *1 (E.D. Tex. June 23, 2017), aff’d, 803 F. App’x 808 (5th Cir. 2020); Paddio v. City of 
Hammond, No. Civ. A. 97-343, 1997 WL 289704, at *3 (E.D. La. May 28, 1997). 
 237. Buehler, 824 F.3d at 556. 
 238. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 
(1993); see also Sherwin Manor Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. McAuliffe, 37 F.3d 1216, 1219 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(stating that federal courts cannot apply a more stringent pleading requirement than the required notice 
requirement). 
 239. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 264 (2006) (stating that it is often “unrealistic” to think 
an intermediary would divulge their reasoning for seeking an indictment, yet some courts require 
plaintiffs in false arrest cases to prove that this same intermediary made their decision based upon 
tainted or incomplete information). 
 240. Id.; see also Shields v. Twiss, 389 F.3d 142, 145–47 (5th Cir. 2004) (alleging that the court 
expected plaintiff to produce grand jury evidence that was impossible to get). 
 241. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 264. 
 242. See, e.g., Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the plaintiff must 
show that an intermediary actually relied on false information to meet their burden). 
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does not exist, but their pleas have fallen on deaf ears.243 
Consider the following real scenario as proof that the burden is 
impossible.  In ruling against the plaintiff, the trial court in Allen v. Jackson 
County stated the plaintiff could not prove what the magistrate relied on, in 
addition to the warrant affidavit, in making her decision to issue a warrant.244  
This step in the case—seeking an arrest warrant—is often the earliest in the 
criminal process.245  It happens long before a criminal defendant knows he 
will be arrested, he will need to hire a criminal lawyer, he will go to trial and 
discover the officer’s actions were unlawful, he will be acquitted or have his 
case dismissed for lack of probable cause, or he will file a lawsuit and retain 
a civil lawyer.  When the magistrate makes her decision, there is no court 
reporter present or notes kept as to what the magistrate heard or knew, aside 
from the facts presented in the warrant affidavit.246  Indeed, the magistrate will 
likely not explain to the officer present what she relied upon in making her 
decision.  She will simply sign or not sign the warrant and the case will 
proceed or it will not.  How then can the plaintiff be expected to provide 
evidence of what the magistrate heard, much less considered?247  The simple 
answer is he cannot.  Yet, the district court in this case ruled the plaintiff was 
barred from suit because he could not prove what the judge contemplated in 
finding probable cause, aside from the warrant affidavit.248 
 
 243. E.g., Fox v. City of Greensboro, 807 F. Supp. 2d 476, 497 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (arguing that 
“providing additional details ‘would be unduly burdensome . . . since all those who would have 
knowledge about [the alleged] conversations are named Defendants.’” (quoting petitioner’s pre-trial 
motion)). 
 244. Allen v. Jackson Cty., No. 1:12-cv-57-HSO-RHW, 2014 WL 940270, at *11 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 
11, 2014). 
 245. See Paradis v. Brady, No. CV-03-150-N-BLW, 2006 WL 8445418, at *6 (D. Idaho Mar. 31, 
2016) (stating that, in Idaho, the issuance of a warrant is the first step of the criminal process and is 
done only after an intermediary determines that there is “probable cause” for an arrest); Lattimore v. 
State, 958 So. 2d 192, 198 (Miss. 2007) (stating that criminal “proceedings are held to have been 
initiated” when a warrant is issued and a defendant is arrested (citing Nicholson v. State, 523 So. 2d 
68, 74 (Miss. 1998))). 
 246. See Linda Zhang, Retaliatory Arrests and the First Amendment: The Chilling Effects of 
Hartman v. Moore on the Freedom of Speech in the Age of Civilian Vigilance, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1328, 
1351 (2017) (asserting that finding evidence showing tainted decision making is “likely to be a rare 
and consequently [a] poor guide[] in structuring a cause of action,” largely because the evidence that 
would provide a basis for this is largely unknowable (citing Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 
(2006))). 
 247. See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 264 (questioning how a plaintiff would go about receiving evidence 
of an intermediary’s considerations in rendering an arrest warrant decision when it would be 
“unrealistic” to think that an intermediary would divulge that information”). 
 248. Allen v. Jackson Cty., No. 1:12-cv-57-HSO-RHW, 2014 WL 940270, at *11 (S.D. Miss., Mar. 
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Take another impossible thing for plaintiffs to prove: what the grand jury 
heard, saw, or knew when it considered an indictment.  Grand jury 
proceedings are secret.249  Court reporters and recordings of testimony are the 
exception, not the rule.250  Grand jurors and everyone involved in a grand jury 
investigation or a criminal case before the grand jury are sworn to secrecy.251  
If grand jury testimony is recorded, the law sets a high burden on a party 
seeking records of grand jury testimony.252  Those records are obtained in the 
rarest of cases, a civil rights suit not being one of them.253  Furthermore, the 
law prohibits anyone from being present during deliberations, making it 
legally impossible for the plaintiff to prove what the grand jury considered 
when making its decision.254  Again, a civil rights plaintiff cannot satisfy this 
evidentiary burden.255 
Civil rights plaintiffs have offered proof, in the rarest of cases, that the 
grand jury considered the wrong kind of law,256 did not hear exculpatory 
 
11, 2014). 
 249. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 19.36 (West 2020) (charging bailiffs who escort grand 
jurors to “keep secret the proceedings of the grand jury”); id. art. 19.34 (stating that the decisions and 
evidence considered by the grand jury will be kept secret unless the “truth or falsity of evidence given 
in the grand jury room” is under investigation). 
 250. See, e.g., Shields v. Twiss, 389 F.3d 142, 145–46 (5th Cir. 2004).  But see FED. R. CRIM. P. 
6(e)(1); TEX. CODE. CRIM. P. ANN. art. 20.012(a) (West 2020). 
 251. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 19.34 (West 2020) (“You solemnly swear that you 
will . . . keep secret . . . .); id. art. 19.36 (charging bailiffs who escort grand jurors to “keep secret the 
proceedings of the grand jury”).  See generally id. art. 20.02 (titled “Proceedings Secret”). 
 252. E.g., id. art. 20.02(d) (permitting disclosure after a criminal defendant demonstrates a 
“particularized need,” which is a nearly impossible burden to meet in any court). 
 253. See, e.g., Shields, 389 F.3d at 147–48 (holding the defendant did not meet the “particularized 
need” standard in a civil rights case); Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at *11, Wilson 
v. Strohman, Civil No. 1-17-CV-00453-ADA (Apr. 6, 2020) (on file with author) (stating that the law 
in Texas permits criminal defendants to access grand jury testimony when they can demonstrate a 
particularized need, but these plaintiffs could not identify one). 
 254. E.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 20.011(b) (West 2020) (stating that only grand jurors may 
be present when the grand jury is deliberating). 
 255. See, e.g., Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at *10 n.2, Wilson, Civil No. 1-17-
CV-00453-ADA (on file with author) (stating that “[t]he Court is not requiring plaintiffs to prove the 
impossible—what occurred inside the secret proceedings of a grand jury[,]” before finding plaintiffs 
failed to meet their burden by proving what evidence the grand jury considered). 
 256. See Russell v. Altom, 546 F. App’x 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the District 
Attorney “present[ed] [the grand jury] three charges based on violations of a . . . [civil statute] that 
contain[ed] no criminal penalties of any kind”). 
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evidence,257 relied upon problematic charging instruments,258 did not know all 
of the facts or evidence,259 reviewed false allegations in the affidavit,260 or 
returned 106 indictments related to one case “using identical fill-in-the-blank 
indictments” in a single day, which hardly demonstrates independence or 
individualized probable cause assessments.261  None of these plaintiffs were 
successful, because the court said they offered speculation or otherwise failed 
to establish that these facts tainted the proceedings.262  Why should the 
plaintiff have the burden to unearth evidence of taint, malice, or omissions 
when it is the defendant or persons aligned with the defendant who organized 
and participated in these proceedings? 
Some courts implicitly recognize the tension between the burden imposed 
and the practical hurdles plaintiffs have to scale.263  For example, in Shields v. 
Twiss, the plaintiff did everything he could to obtain grand jury evidence: he 
attempted to subpoena grand jurors so he could depose them, but the 
defendants quashed his subpoenas; he sought to obtain records from the 
hearings, but discovered there were none; after he was ordered by the judge 
not to contact any grand jurors, he sought permission from another court, but 
failed.264  The district court ruled against him because he failed to show that 
 
 257. E.g., Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that certain 
exculpatory evidence was not presented to the grand jury).  The State, however, is not obligated to 
provide the grand jury with exculpatory evidence nor does the defendant have a corresponding right 
to have a well-informed grand jury.  United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51–52 (1992); see also 
Savino, 331 F.3d at 75 (explaining that the prosecutor has “the discretion and authority to decide what 
evidence to present to the grand jury”). 
 258. Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at *2, Wilson, Civil No. 1-17-CV-00453-ADA 
(on file with author) (finding that the prosecutor used the exact same charging instrument and affidavit 
for 177 criminal defendants arrested en masse; all cases were later dismissed). 
 259. Krueger v. Bremer, No. 94-50332, 1995 WL 84147, at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 8, 1995); Trois v. 
Long, No. A-07-CA-965-SS, 2008 WL 11409933, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2008), aff’d, 362 F. App’x 
399 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 260. Shaw v. Villanueva, 918 F.3d 414, 416, 418 (5th Cir. 2019) (finding that although the 
policeman lied in affidavit, the officers who presented the affidavit did not know of the lie, so there 
was no evidence they intended to deceive intermediary). 
 261. Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint at *31, Smith v. Strohman, Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-474-
ADA (Feb. 19, 2019) (on file with author). 
 262. See, e.g., Russell v. Altom, 546 F. App’x 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he improper inclusion 
of a statute with no criminal penalties does nothing to undercut the other half of the indictment, which 
was based on a clearly applicable statute that carries criminal penalties.”). 
 263. See, e.g., Shields v. Twiss, 389 F.3d 142, 147 (5th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that the plaintiff’s 
requirement of showing a particularized need faces the procedural prospect of overcoming the “well-
established, long-standing public policy” that protects the secrecy of grand jury proceedings). 
 264. Id. at 145–46. 
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evidence was withheld from the grand jurors.265 
On appeal, Shields alleged that the judicial orders made it impossible for 
him to obtain evidence to support his claims.266  The Fifth Circuit began its 
analysis by acknowledging that under federal and state law there is a “general 
rule of secrecy [that] shrouds the proceedings of grand juries.”267  The court 
then recognized an exception to the rule, before determining that Shields 
could not meet it under these circumstances.268  In the end, the court affirmed 
the district court’s decision.269  If the law, the district courts, and the appellate 
courts deny attempts to obtain grand jury evidence, how can they expect 
plaintiffs to produce it in civil rights cases? 
It is more logical and just to require defendants to establish that they 
presented all the facts to the intermediary, as only they know what facts were 
actually presented.270  If the facts were presented to a magistrate or a judge, 
the defendants would know what those intermediaries heard, whereas the 
plaintiff would not.  If the intermediary was a grand jury, only the defendants 
would know what the grand jury heard.271  The plaintiff has no real ability to 
uncover the evidence that the grand jury saw or heard.  Courts adhering to the 
doctrine could permit a jury to decide factual issues about what evidence the 
intermediary considered when the plaintiff’s and defendant’s assertions differ.  
That is what courts in other jurisdictions do.272 
 
 265. Id. at 146. 
 266. Id. at 147. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 147–48. 
 269. Id. at 148–49. 
 270. See Shields, 389 F.3d at 148 (denying plaintiff’s request to obtain grand jury evidence when 
defendant deputy testified under oath “that she presented all relevant information in her possession” 
to the grand jury, leaving plaintiff with no way to rebut such testimony); see also Fox v. City of 
Greensboro, 807 F. Supp. 2d 476, 497 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (asserting that “all those who would have 
knowledge about [the alleged] conversations are named Defendants”). 
 271. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art 20.011 (West 2020) (limiting the persons who may be 
present during grand jury proceedings, and not including the accused, who would be the plaintiff in a 
subsequent civil rights case). 
 272. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 822 F. Supp. 870, 876 (D. Conn. 1993) (holding that if 
pleadings, assumed true, by plaintiffs raise a factual issue as to whether officer made false assertions 
or omitted information to the intermediary, it is a question for the jury to resolve), aff’d, 33 F.3d 50 
(2d Cir. 1994). 
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IV. FEDERAL RESPONSES TO THE DOCTRINE 
This section will examine some of the cases that have used an independent 
intermediary analysis and the results those courts reached. 
A. The Doctrine Is Inapplicable and the Plaintiff Can Sue 
A number of courts have found the causation rule inapplicable.273  
Because the Fifth Circuit created the rule, it makes sense to start with a Fifth 
Circuit case that found it inapplicable: Winfrey v. Rogers.274  In Winfrey, the 
plaintiff was considered a murder suspect after a blundered investigation that 
began with forensic science errors and ended with a lying jailhouse 
informant.275  Officers knowingly omitted these problems from the affidavits 
they used to obtain search and arrest warrants..276  Winfrey sat in jail for two 
years awaiting trial before a jury quickly acquitted him.277  Winfrey sued a 
police investigator for malicious prosecution.278 
On appeal, the defendant claimed the grand jury and the trial judge were 
independent intermediaries, thus barring Winfrey’s suit.279  The Fifth Circuit 
assumed that because neither side presented evidence to the contrary, the 
grand jury probably heard no more than the facts from the warrant 
affidavits.280  The court could not determine whether “all the facts [were] 
presented to the grand jury” or the judge.281 
The Winfrey decision is important for a few reasons.  First, the court 
endorsed a neutral burden by suggesting that both sides need to produce 
 
 273. See, e.g., Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483, 497 (5th Cir. 2018) (explaining that “the chain of 
causation between the officer’s conduct and the unlawful arrest ‘is broken only where all the facts are 
presented to the grand jury’” (quoting Cuadra v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 813 (5th Cir. 
2010))), cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. Winfrey, 139 S. Ct. 1549 (2019); Cuadra, 626 F.3d at 813–
14 (5th Cir. 2010); Buehler v. City of Austin, No. 1:17-CV-724-LY, 2018 WL 4225046, at *4 (W.D. 
Tex. Sept. 5, 2018); Nerio v. Evans, No. A-17-CA-037-LY, 2017 WL 2773716, at *4 (W.D. Tex. June 
26, 2017); Smith v. Tullis, No. 5:15-CV-493-DAE, 2016 WL 6634948, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 
2016). 
 274. 901 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 275. Id. at 488–89. 
 276. Id. at 489. 
 277. Id. at 490. 
 278. Id. at 493. 
 279. Id. at 496–97. 
 280. Id. at 497. 
 281. Id. (quoting Cuadra v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 813 (5th Cir. 2010)). 
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evidence about what facts the intermediaries heard.282  Second, because the 
warrant affidavits were missing important facts, the court presumed the other 
intermediaries were missing facts too.283  The court clearly felt sympathy for 
Winfrey because the facts were egregious.284  Winfrey’s sister’s appeal—she 
was also convicted for a crime she did not commit—led the Fifth Circuit to 
say that the defendant had to prove the alleged omitted evidence was actually 
presented to the judge.285  These two opinions are favorable for plaintiffs 
because they liken the doctrine to an affirmative defense by placing the burden 
of proving what the intermediary heard on the party aligned with the 
intermediary. 
Among the other courts that have ruled the doctrine inapplicable, some 
courts found enough factual differences in the pleadings, assuming the 
plaintiff’s pleadings were true, to determine the plaintiff should have a trial.286  
Other courts determined the alleged intermediaries were not independent 
enough or legally qualified to be intermediaries.287  While a number of courts 
 
 282. Id. at 496–97.  The Winfrey court was not the only court to create a neutral evidentiary burden.  
See McLennan v. Longhorn Car-Truck Rental, No. A-08-CA-327 LY, 2008 WL 11358066, at *3 
(W.D. Tex. May 8, 2008). 
 283. Winfrey, 901 F.3d at 497. 
 284. See id. at 489 (detailing the errors in the investigation). 
 285. Winfrey, 766 F. App’x at 71. 
 286. See Buehler v. City of Austin, No. 1:17-CV-724-LY, 2018 WL 4225046, at *3–4 (W.D. Tex. 
Sept. 5, 2018) (denying motion to dismiss because of differences between the warrant affidavit and 
the plaintiff’s complaint, even though the plaintiff did not plead any specific misrepresentations); 
Basler v. Barron, No. CV H-15-2254, 2016 WL 1672573, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2016) (stating that 
the plaintiff alleged specific facts that, if presumed true, would raise a factual issue for a jury to 
resolve); Buchanek v. City of Victoria, No. Civ. A. V-08-08, 2008 WL 4093623, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 
28, 2008) (“[T]he assertions contained in Buchanek’s Amended Complaint paint a picture of an 
unreasonable, malicious and politically-motivated investigation which was undertaken without any 
underlying merit.”); Jackson v. Alleghany Cty., No. Civ. A. 707CV0417, 2008 WL 3992351, at *19 
(W.D. Va. Aug. 28, 2008) (holding that the plaintiff alleged enough facts to establish that the officers’ 
wrongful acts led to his arrest without probable cause); Culpepper v. Williams, No. Civ. A. 
1:06CV125LGJM, 2007 WL 2406970, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 20, 2007) (holding that the pleadings 
were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss); Calhoun v. City of Austin, No. A-06-CA-185 AA, 
2007 WL 9700763, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2007) (holding that the pleading sufficiently alleged that 
the arrest warrant contained materially false statements and omissions). 
 287. See Nerio v. Evans, No. A-17-CA-037-LY, 2017 WL 2773716, at *4 (W.D. Tex. June 26, 
2017) (stating that, if the plaintiff’s allegations were true, the magistrate did not act independently, as 
the officers arrested the wrong person and falsely identified him); Smith v. Tullis, No. 5:15-CV-493-
DAE, 2016 WL 6634948, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2016) (holding that a magistrate did not act 
independently, as officers arrested the wrong person and falsely identified him); Goodarzi v. Hartzog, 
No. Civ. A. H-12-2870, 2013 WL 3110056, at *20 (S.D. Tex. June 14, 2013) (finding that the 
defendant’s arguments raise doubts as to the judge’s independence). 
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found the bad actor had withheld information, lied to the intermediary, or there 
was a factual issue on these issues,288 other courts determined that not all of 
the facts, as required by Hand, had been presented to the intermediary.289  
Some courts have found it impossible for the intermediary to have known all 
the facts because the presence of later-discovered exculpatory evidence, if 
presented, would have resulted in a finding of no probable cause.290  Still other 
courts rule the doctrine does not apply for cloudier reasons.291 
B. The Doctrine Applies and the Plaintiff Is Barred from Suit 
A number of federal courts applying the rule found that the intermediaries 
made truly independent decisions, uninfluenced by the officers.292  Others held 
 
 288. See Morris v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657, 673 (5th Cir. 1999); Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 
1384, 1390 (9th Cir. 1988) (allowing plaintiff to proceed to trial because of conflicting facts given by 
officers and “striking omissions in the police report”); Arizmendi v. Brownsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 
No. 1:16-CV-00063, 2017 WL 4479951, at *2, *4–7 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 2017) (acknowledging a 
factual issue as to whether the officer knowingly or recklessly misrepresented material statements in 
the warrant affidavit he submitted to the magistrate), rev’d sub nom. Arizmendi v. Gabbert, 919 F.3d 
891 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 220 (2019); Ferguson v. Dunn, No. 1:16-CV-272, 2017 WL 
9286964, at *5 (E.D. Tex. May 19, 2017) (explaining that an officer “misdirected” the judge numerous 
times in his affidavit when the law did not even authorize his arrest); Smith, 2016 WL 6634948, at *8 
(stating that the Justice of the Peace was given a warrant application with facts the officer knew the 
evidence did not supported); Rodriguez v. City of Houston, No. Civ. A. H-06-2650, 2007 WL 
1189639, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2007) (denying motion to dismiss where plaintiff alleged officers 
concealed exculpatory evidence from prosecutors, grand jury, and others involved in the 
investigation); Seibert v. Cannaday, No. 3:03-CV-0672-P, 2005 WL 646048, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 
18, 2005) (explaining a factual issue as to whether officer circulated false information about plaintiff). 
 289. See Bolton v. City of Austin, No. A-17-CA-077-SS, 2018 WL 2392557, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 
25, 2018); Goodarzi, 2013 WL 3110056, at *20 (“There is no indication that the particular facts of the 
arrest were put before the judge in the instant case, no less that there was a full and fair presentation 
of the facts.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Hamrick v. City of Eustace, 732 F. Supp. 1390, 1396 
n.3 (E.D. Tex. 1990). 
 290. See Jones v. Eder, No. CV H-15-2919, 2016 WL 4571114, at *4 (S.D. Tex. July 19, 2016), 
aff’d, 778 F. App’x 327 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 206 L. Ed. 2d 937 (May 18, 2020); Morris, 69 
F. Supp. 2d at 886. 
 291. See, e.g., Garza v. Guerra, No. Civ. A. B-08-084, 2010 WL 2607275, at *14 (S.D. Tex. June 
25, 2010) (stating that an examining trial is not a final judgment, so a probable cause determination 
made there does not insulate the defendant), aff’d, 463 F. App’x 316 (5th Cir. 2012); Garza v. City of 
Austin, No. A-08-CA-534-LY, 2009 WL 10700446, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2009) (holding that 
the doctrine does not apply to “novel” facts, which included officers arresting the wrong person); 
McLennan v. Longhorn Car-Truck Rental, No. A-08-CA-327 LY, 2008 WL 11358066, at *3 (W.D. 
Tex. May 8, 2008) (ruling it was “premature” to apply the doctrine at the time). 
 292. See Buehler v. City of Austin/Austin Police Dep’t, 824 F.3d 548, 556 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(reasoning that the grand jury heard from both sides before making its decision and, thus, was truly 
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that the plaintiff simply failed to show the actors deceived the intermediary or 
acted maliciously.293  One court found that even though proffered evidence 
may have been misleading, there was no evidence that the misrepresentations 
affected the intermediary’s deliberations.294  Some courts found that the 
plaintiff failed to prove knowing misconduct or otherwise failed to meet the 
declared burden.295  In rare cases, the plaintiff knew the facts that the 
intermediary heard and the court found that these facts were sufficient to 
satisfy the rule.296  Courts have denied claims when the bad actor was not a 
 
independent); Eubanks v. Gerwen, 40 F.3d 1157, 1161 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that the officers “did 
not make the decision as to whether or not to prosecute Eubanks; nor did they act in such a way as to 
improperly influence the decision by the State Attorney”); Cherry v. Garner, No. Civ. A. 03-CV-
01696, 2004 WL 3019241, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2004) (noting that the officer did not influence 
wholly independent intermediaries). 
 293. See Rothstein v. Carriere, 373 F.3d 275, 284 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that the plaintiff cannot 
win when he fails to show irregular proceedings before the grand jury); Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 
1195–97 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that the plaintiff failed to show that the officers deceived the 
intermediaries); Holcomb v. McGraw, 262 F. Supp. 3d 437, 451–52 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (observing that 
the plaintiffs failed to prove that the officers tainted the magistrate’s probable cause decision); Griffith 
v. Pamerleau, No. SA-14-CV-591-PM, 2015 WL 2446003, at *5 (W.D. Tex. May 20, 2015) (finding 
no evidence that the officer tainted the intermediary’s deliberations); Morgan v. City of Waco, No. 3-
01-CV-2818-K, 2003 WL 21640563, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 9, 2003) (finding no evidence that the 
intermediary’s decision was tainted). 
 294. Crostley v. Lamar Cty., No. 5:10-CV-017, 2010 WL 11468796, at *6 (E.D. Tex. July 21, 
2010). 
 295. See Smith v. Sheriff, Clay Cty., 506 F. App’x 894, 900 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that even 
though court was “troubled by the omissions of certain facts from the affidavit,” at most, the omissions 
were negligent, which is not enough); Charles v. Brajdic, 420 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2019) 
(finding that the plaintiff offered no taint evidence); Thompson v. Roussell, No. 2:17-CV-101-KS-
MTP, 2018 WL 9786079, at *4 (S.D. Miss. June 11, 2018) (noting that the plaintiff’s complaint about 
an officer’s unprofessionalism did not rise to level of taint or omission), aff’d, No. 18-60672, 2020 
WL 1651277 (5th Cir. Apr. 2, 2020); Scott v. White, No. 1:16-CV-1287-RP, 2018 WL 2014093, at 
*4 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2018) (finding no proof of knowing conduct); Henry v. City of Taylor, No. A-
06-CA-1007 AWA, 2008 WL 2557489, at *6 (W.D. Tex. June 19, 2008) (finding no knowing 
conduct); Cherry, 2004 WL 3019241, at *2 n.5 (noting that the plaintiff “provided no additional factual 
support for her claims[,] . . . no additional depositions, affidavits or other competent, helpful or 
supporting evidence”). 
 296. See Furlow v. Baker, No. 6:18-CV-00127-RWS, 2019 WL 1984142, at *3–4 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 
11, 2019) (noting the court sifted through the evidence presented to the grand jury and determined that 
all of the information was presented to the special prosecutors who presented the case to the grand 
jury); Arceneaux v. Louisiana, No. Civ. 04-1033, 2008 WL 2369188, at *4 (W.D. La. June 10, 2008) 
(observing that the court carefully analyzed all of the documents and the judge’s findings, and 
compared them to the warrant affidavit to determine that the judge heard all of the facts and made an 
independent decision); Porter v. Lowndes Cty., 406 F. Supp. 2d 708, 712 (N.D. Miss. 2005) (observing 
that the grand jury heard all of the evidence, given the record the plaintiff provided and what the court 
was able to ascertain). 
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defendant or when the defendant did not present the facts to the 
intermediary.297  In a handful of cases, it was the intermediary who acted with 
malice or unethically.298  In these cases, the officers were shielded from suit 
because they were not the bad actors.299  Finally, some courts approach the 
doctrine’s application in a strict-liability way without analyzing the facts.300 
C. Rejection of the Doctrine Outright 
Several courts in circuits that adhere to the doctrine struggle with 
Malley’s clear rejection of it and seem confused about which higher court to 
follow.301  They find ways to reject Hand’s test and apply Malley’s302 and 
 
 297. See Carlson v. Lapuszynski, No. A-10-CA-130-AWA, 2011 WL 2412607, at *6–8 (W.D. Tex. 
June 9, 2011) (assessing all the material the intermediary had, along with an alleged omission, and 
determining that the evidence supported a probable cause finding); Cuadra v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 
No. CV H-07-3300, 2009 WL 10703694, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2009) (determining that the 
defendants were not liable because they were not bad actors), aff’d, 626 F.3d 808 (5th Cir. 2010), cert 
denied, 563 U.S. 1033 (2011); Peters v. City of Biloxi, 57 F. Supp. 2d 366, 371–73 (S.D. Miss. 1999) 
(determining that despite confusing language in the warrant affidavit, the record was clear that the 
intermediary considered all of the evidence). 
 298. See Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647–49 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that the prosecutor acted 
unethically and pursued charges when the evidence was not credible); Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 
939, 943 (7th Cir. 1972) (“[T]he failure to inform the plaintiff properly of his right to plead not guilty 
and the failure to furnish counsel was attributable to the court and not to the sheriff.”); Rhodes v. 
Smithers, 939 F. Supp. 1256, 127–78 (S.D.W. Va. 1995) (finding that the officers performed their 
duty of presenting evidence to the prosecutor, and any misleading of the grand jury or bad faith in 
seeking charges did not involve the officers). 
 299. See supra note 298. 
 300. See Rolle v. West, No. 5:18-CV-8-OC-30PRL, 2018 WL 3134417, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 
2018); Rolle v. Shelfer, No. 5:18-CV-18-OC-30PRL, 2018 WL 3151668, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 
2018); Pardue v. Jackson Cty., No. 1:14-CV-290-KS-MTP, 2016 WL 3024153, at *2 (S.D. Miss. May 
25, 2016); Roderick v. City of Gulfport, 144 F. Supp. 2d 622, 628 (S.D. Miss. 2000).  
 301. E.g., Richardson v. Bridges, No. 5:09-CV-186, 2015 WL 13598319, at *8–13 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 
17, 2015) (examining probable cause pursuant to the causation doctrine, Franks, and Malley analysis); 
Maier v. Green, 485 F. Supp. 2d 711, 719 (W.D. La. 2007) (citing both Hand and Malley together as 
if the latter supports the former); Hightower v. Schaubhut, No. Civ. A. 89-3243, 1990 WL 58129, at 
*3–4 (E.D. La. Apr. 26, 1990) (stating that “the Supreme Court questioned the validity of this broken 
causation rule and noted that such a rule was inconsistent with the Court’s prior interpretation of 
section 1983,” but then citing Malley and Hand together and  performing a probable cause analysis). 
 302. See Smith v. Tullis, No. 5:15-CV-493-DAE, 2016 WL 6634948, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 
2016) (determining that intermediaries were not independent or did not have decision-making 
authority, so there was no causation argument); Sanders v. Kemper Cty., No. 3:13CV906LRA, 2014 
WL 4626704, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 15, 2014) (finding a conclusory statement in the search warrant 
affidavit because it provided no information to the intermediary, and that the Hand rule does not apply 
to search warrants); Garza v. City of Austin, No. A-08-CA-534-LY, 2009 WL 10700446, at *1–3 
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interestingly, sometimes doctrine-friendly circuit courts bless those 
decisions.303  In Winfrey, the Fifth Circuit relied on a Malley analysis rather 
than its own doctrine, and it has done the same in other cases too.304  Perhaps 
when it deems the plaintiff worthy enough, it uses Malley, and when it does 
not, it uses the doctrine; the former is more forgiving to plaintiffs than the 
latter. 
D. Straddling the Hand and Malley Divide 
In Jones v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit straddled the fence 
between a Hand analysis and a Malley analysis.305  Judge Posner authored the 
thoughtful and well-written opinion.306  George Jones was falsely accused of 
capital murder following the brutal sexual assault and murder of a teenage 
girl.307  Jones was a brainy, accomplished, and well-thought-of teen in high 
school.308  In contrast, the investigators were incompetent, reckless, and 
dishonest: the identification procedures they used were extremely suggestive, 
the evidence pointed to other suspects, and the lab reports indicated Jones was 
innocent.309  However, none of these facts came to light.310  A grand jury 
 
(W.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2009) (finding that the doctrine does not apply to the “novel” facts of this case, 
therefore the plaintiff could move forward); Henry v. City of Taylor, No. A-06-CA-1007 AWA, 2008 
WL 2557489, at *6 (W.D. Tex. June 19, 2008) (examining probable cause supporting two warrants); 
Hightower, 1990 WL 58129, at *3–4; Hamrick v. City of Eustace, 732 F. Supp. 1390, 1396 (E.D. Tex. 
1990) (“As for the specific theory that the intermediary’s decision to issue a warrant breaks the causal 
chain, the Supreme Court has specifically held that such a theory is inconsistent with their 
interpretation of section 1983.”); Farmer v. Lawson, 510 F. Supp. 91, 96 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (“The 
questions for the fact-finder are whether the sheriffs knew or should have known that the search 
warrant was invalid and whether the sheriffs acted in good faith in securing the search warrant.”).  
 303. E.g., Taylor v. City of Nederland, 685 F. Supp. 616, 617–18 (E.D. Tex. 1988), aff’d, 868 F.2d 
1269 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 304. Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483, 492–94 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. 
Winfrey, 139 S. Ct. 1549 (2019); see also Blake v. Lambert, 921 F.3d 215, 220–22 (5th Cir. 2019) 
(analyzing facts using a Malley analysis); Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 919 n.8 (5th 
Cir. 2000) (using an objectively reasonable test). 
 305. 856 F.2d 985, 992–96 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 306. Id. at 988. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 988–89. 
 309. Id. at 988–91. 
 310. See id. at 988–91 (describing how defendants employed faulty investigation practices, even 
when the evidence pointed to someone other than Jones, and the subsequent steps investigators took 
to conceal their bad actions). 
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indicted Jones and his case proceeded to trial.311  During trial, an officer who 
knew about concealed exculpatory evidence came forward, the judge granted 
a mistrial, and the prosecutor dismissed the case.312  Jones sued the City of 
Chicago and its officers for false arrest and malicious prosecution and won 
more than $800,000 in damages.313  The defendants appealed to the Seventh 
Circuit.314 
Judge Posner began by acknowledging that arresting a person without 
probable cause violates both the Fourth Amendment and the common law, 
and the victim is entitled to receive damages.315  The defendants tried to argue 
the prosecutor’s decision to pursue charges led to the harms Jones suffered in 
jail as he awaited trial.316  But Judge Posner said the jury could have believed 
the officers caused Jones’s injuries.317  After all, had the prosecutor known 
what the police knew, he would have dismissed the case.318  Judge Posner then 
reasoned, 
a prosecutor’s decision to charge, a grand jury’s decision to indict, a 
prosecutor’s decision not to drop charges but to proceed to trial—
none of these decisions will shield a police officer who deliberately 
supplied misleading information that influenced the decision . . . .  If 
police officers have been instrumental in the plaintiff’s continued 
confinement or prosecution, they cannot escape liability by pointing 
to the decisions of prosecutors or grand jurors or magistrates to 
confine or prosecute him.  They cannot hide behind the officials 
whom they have defrauded.319 
Following this Hand-like causation analysis, the court moved to a Malley 
analysis, determining that the officers’ actions were not objectively 
reasonable and that the defendant’s causal argument was “unsound.”320  The 
 
 311. Id. at 990. 
 312. Id. at 991. 
 313. Id. at 988. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. at 992. 
 316. Id. at 993. 
 317. Id.  
 318. Id.  
 319. Id. at 994 (internal citations omitted). 
 320. Id. at 995–96. 
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court then affirmed the jury’s decision in favor of Jones.321 
V. THE DOCTRINE CANNOT WITHSTAND SCRUTINY 
There are many reasons to get rid of the doctrine and not one reason to 
keep it.  The doctrine has been wielded when it suits the courts, abandoned 
when it does not, and it has created absurd results.  What the First Circuit said 
about the independent intermediary doctrine in 1984 is no less true today: it 
is incapable of withstanding scrutiny.322 
It cannot withstand scrutiny because it has no history in common law torts 
or in the Civil Rights Act.  A decade before the Act became law, courts not 
only recognized a right to be free from groundless arrests,323 but also held 
citizens civilly liable for instituting one, regardless of whether an intermediary 
was involved.324  In this way, the courts used a proximate cause standard.  
The Act’s primary purpose was to provide a federal remedy for 
plaintiffs.325  It permitted any person deprived of any constitutional right to 
bring an action against the defendant in the federal courts.326  The Supreme 
Court has held that an official may claim an immunity if he can identify one 
from the common law tort immunities available in 1871.327  However, the 
doctrine came into being more than a century after the Civil Rights Act was 
enacted, which supports the Supreme Court’s statement that the doctrine is 
“inconsistent” with § 1983 because it was not a defense that existed at the time 
of the Act’s creation.328 
It cannot withstand scrutiny because it does not adhere to classic tort 
causation principles.  In Monroe, the Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights 
Act “should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man 
responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.”329  In Malley, the First 
Circuit rejected the causation rule because it does not follow the classic torts 
“but for” proximate causation model: but for the officer’s poor investigation, 
 
 321. Id. 
 322. Briggs v. Malley, 748 F.2d 715, 721 (1st Cir. 1984), aff’d, 475 U.S. 335 (1986). 
 323. See Comfort v. Fulton, 39 Barb. 56, 57 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1861). 
 324. See Perkins v. Mitchell, 31 Barb. 461, 468 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1860). 
 325. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172, 178 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. 
Dep’t of. Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 326. Id. at 179–80. 
 327. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339–40 (1986). 
 328. Id. at 342, 344 n.7. 
 329. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187. 
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the magistrate would not have signed the warrant, and the defendant would 
not have been arrested.330  The Supreme Court stated in Malley that because 
the common law acknowledged a causal link between the issuance of a 
complaint and an arrest, § 1983 recognizes a causal link between the officer’s 
actions and the arrest.331   
It cannot withstand scrutiny because it is based on off-topic secondary 
sources, and it flies in the face of binding statutory and Supreme Court 
authority.  Instead of relying on the Civil Rights Act or Monroe, which hold 
officers liable for the natural consequences of their actions,332 the Rodriguez 
and Smith courts justified their newly created doctrine by citing to secondary 
tort law sources that addressed private citizen tort liability, not state actor 
liability.333  The Supreme Court rejected Malley’s argument that he was like 
the private citizens in the cases cited by the A.L.R. article because, 
historically, complainants who acted maliciously or without probable cause 
were liable for their actions.334  For these reasons, the doctrine must fail. 
It cannot withstand scrutiny because it places courts in a position to 
choose not to enforce civil rights claims.335  In Malley, the Supreme Court 
cautioned courts to exercise restraint when immunizing officers because it is 
not the courts’ role to “make a freewheeling policy choice” about the Civil 
Rights Act, but to interpret the congressional intent behind the Act.336  Monroe 
is jam-packed with congressional intent.337  In comparison, no court relying 
on any iteration of the doctrine has ever attempted to connect it to 
congressional intent.  It simply cannot be done.  Courts that use the doctrine 
 
 330. Briggs v. Malley, 748 F.2d 715, 721 (1st Cir. 1984), aff’d, 475 U.S. 335 (1986). 
 331. Malley, 475 U.S. at 344 n.7. 
332 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187 (“Section 1979 should be read against the background of tort liability 
that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.”). 
 333. See supra notes 100–105 (explaining how the court in Rodriguez relied on secondary sources 
for support); supra notes 112–117 (explaining how Smith was the first decision to connect the doctrine 
to the Fourth Amendment). 
 334. Malley, 475 U.S. at 340–41. 
 335. See e.g., Imber v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 412–13, 427 (1976) (choosing to uphold absolute 
immunity for a prosecutor who knowingly used false testimony and suppressed material evidence at 
the plaintiff’s criminal trial, notwithstanding the Court’s assertion that “this immunity does leave the 
genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest 
action deprives him of liberty”). 
 336. Malley, 475 U.S. at 342. 
 337. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171–92 (1961) (discussing the congressional intent behind 
§ 1979 and ultimately holding that officers are liable for the natural consequences of their actions), 
overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of. Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
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are making prohibited freewheeling policy decisions.338  The doctrine allows 
judges to circumvent the Civil Rights Act and legislate from the bench.  It 
allows courts to have an unjustifiable bias against § 1983 plaintiffs, as well as 
an unwarranted trust in law enforcement officers that the founders of our 
country and the authors of the Act a century later were wise not to have. 
VI. THE DOCTRINE LEADS TO ABSURD RESULTS 
The doctrine creates illogical outcomes.  This section will examine two 
cases with absurd results and an entire category of cases with completely 
contradictory outcomes and rationales to illustrate this point. 
In Graham v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, officers pulled Terry Graham, 
an African-American man, out of a bus, despite the fact that the bus riders and 
Graham, all of whom witnessed an assault the officers were investigating, told 
the officers that Graham was not the suspect.339  Graham was polite, but 
officers falsely claimed he was drunk and arrested him for public intoxication, 
which is a low-level misdemeanor requiring no intermediary’s approval.340  
Officers handcuffed Graham, placed him under arrest, and as they directed 
him to the patrol car, one officer used force against Graham and the two began 
to struggle on the ground.341  This struggle formed the basis for his second 
arrest: assault on a peace officer, which is a felony offense.342  Notably, the 
officers’ report contained no allegation that any officer was assaulted or 
suffered injuries.343  Officers pepper sprayed and beat Graham, causing him 
“extensive facial injuries”; he had to be admitted to the hospital because the 
jail refused to take him.344  The hospital records did not indicate he had 
ingested any alcohol or that he was intoxicated.345  The grand jury indicted 
Graham for the felony offense, but the Dallas District Attorney’s Office 
 
 338. See Malley, 475 U.S. at 342 (“We reemphasize that our role is to interpret the intent of 
Congress in enacting § 1983, not to make a freewheeling policy choice, and that we are guided in 
interpreting Congress’ intent by the common-law tradition.”). 
 339. 288 F. Supp. 3d 711, 720 (N.D. Tex. 2017). 
 340. Id. at 721, 743. 
 341. Id. at 722. 
 342. Id. at 722–23. 
 343. Id. at 722.  
 344. Id.  
 345. Id.  
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dismissed the case.346  Graham sued.347 
The Texas district court found that the defendants violated Graham’s 
Fourth Amendment rights in the public intoxication arrest, but not in the 
assault on a peace officer arrest that occurred minutes later.348  The reason: the 
first arrest required no intermediary approval so there was no causal break, 
whereas the second arrest was untouchable and unreviewable because a grand 
jury indicted him.349  Graham should have been able to put both arrests before 
a jury because the second arrest was a direct result of the first unlawful arrest.  
The court’s reasoning on the basis of the intermediary’s involvement is 
illogical. 
In 2005, a forty-five-year-old African-American woman named Michell 
Deville was driving with her two-year-old granddaughter in her car when an 
officer stopped her for speeding.350  Though she complied with the officer’s 
request to see her license and registration, she informed him she was not 
speeding.351  When he requested that she step out of the car, she refused and 
said that she had done nothing wrong.352  He asked her to step out of her car 
again and told her he was calling Child Protective Services to take her 
granddaughter away from her.353  Deville called family members and begged 
them to come to the scene.354 
When another officer arrived and asked Deville to get out of the car and 
she refused, he used a heavy flashlight to smash her window.355  Officers 
forcefully pulled Deville from her vehicle, and she suffered head injuries as a 
result.356  After she received treatment for her injuries at the hospital, she was 
charged with speeding, aggravated assault, and resisting arrest.357  Officers 
later claimed they arrested her for failing to sign the speeding ticket, but 
Deville said she was never given a ticket, shown a ticket, or asked to sign a 
 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. at 723. 
 348. Id. at 737–40. 
 349. Id. at 737–41.  
 350. Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 161 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 351. Id.  
 352. Id.  
 353. Id.  
 354. Id.  
 355. Id. at 162. 
 356. Id.  
 357. Id.  
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ticket.358  The district attorney dismissed all charges.359 
Nine months later, when the police department heard about her civil suit, 
they arrested her again for two baseless charges, which the district attorney 
also dismissed.360  The only difference between the first set of charges and the 
second set was that the officers arrested her pursuant to a warrant authorized 
by a justice of the peace for the second set.361 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted that the original officer had a history of 
bad arrests, numerous citizens had filed complaints against him, and both the 
sheriff and the district attorney had asked him to resign, the latter because he 
had previously falsely arrested another person.362  In this case, the officer had 
no evidence that Deville was speeding, his suggestion that he initially arrested 
her for failing to sign a ticket was implausible, and his actions were 
objectively unreasonable, so the court found he was not entitled to qualified 
immunity.363  Even though there was no probable cause to support the second 
set of arrests, because an intermediary signed the warrants and the plaintiffs 
could not prove the intermediary’s decision was tainted, Deville was barred 
from suit on those two groundless arrests.364  Again, this result is absurd, 
particularly because the court recognized the warrant for the first arrest was 
not supported by probable cause.365 
Common law torts dating back to the creation of the Civil Rights Act held 
actors who instigated baseless arrests liable.366  Plaintiffs who demonstrated 
an absence of probable cause could sue for malicious prosecution and false 
arrest.367  The Civil Rights Act was designed to protect citizens from these 
kinds of civil rights violations.  Had the Graham and Deville courts applied 
Monroe, Malley, and Harlow, as the Supreme Court required, they would have 
found the officers’ actions objectively unreasonable.  The fact that the officers 
in Deville’s case got a justice of the peace to sign the warrants should not 
 
 358. Id.  
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id. at 165–66. 
 363. Id. at 166. 
 364. Id. at 170. 
 365. Id. at 166, 170. 
 366. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340–41 (1986) (“In 1871, the generally accepted rule was 
that one who procured the issuance of an arrest warrant by submitting a complaint could be held liable 
if the complaint was made maliciously and without probable cause.”). 
 367. See id. at 340–42. 
[Vol. 48: 1, 2021] Replacing the Independent Intermediary Doctrine 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
50 
insulate them from suit.368  A Texas district court confronted with analogous 
facts—an incredible defendant, a suspicious arrest, and a significant delay 
following the initial arrest—ruled in favor of the plaintiff for a unique reason, 
which was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit.369  There simply is no reason for such 
disparate and illogical results. 
But it is not just cases like Graham’s and Deville’s that lead to illogical, 
uneven, and unjust results.  The absurdity is seen in cases with similarly 
situated plaintiffs whose cases end with contradictory results and rationales.  
Consider a class of cases as one example: mistaken identity cases.370  In 
Rodriguez, officers arrested the wrong Margaret, but the Fifth Circuit found 
that her actual innocence did not vitiate probable cause, and its new doctrine 
barred suit.371  In a 2009 case, a Texas district court ruled that the plaintiff’s 
mistaken identity case was “novel” and therefore the doctrine did not apply to 
bar suit.372  However, it appeared as if there was nothing unique about the 
case’s facts other than that the judge did not want to apply the doctrine.  In a 
2005 Texas case, where the wrong Kelli was arrested, the district court found 
that the officers’ actions were, at most, negligent, but because a prosecutor 
reviewed his probable cause affidavit, the doctrine conferred qualified 
immunity.373 
In a 2017 Texas case, officers should have arrested Carlos Nerio who 
lived at one address, but instead mistakenly arrested Carlos Henry Nerio, Jr., 
who lived at another address.374  The officers included the latter Carlos’s name 
on the warrant, even though he was innocent.375  The court held that “the judge 
 
 368. Compare Malley, 475 U.S. at 341 (“Given malice and the lack of probable cause, the 
complainant enjoyed no immunity.”), with Deville, 567 F.3d at 170 (“[R]eview by [an] independent 
intermediary relieves [defendants] of liability for the alleged false arrest.”). 
 369. Garza v. Guerra, No. Civ. A. B-08-084, 2010 WL 2607275, at *1–4, *17–18 (S.D. Tex. June 
25, 2010), aff’d, 463 F. App’x 316 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 370. See Kugle v. Shields, No. 93-5567, 1995 WL 450219, at *1 (5th Cir. July 7, 1995); Rodriguez 
v. Ritchey, 556 F.2d 1185, 1187–88 (5th Cir. 1977); Nerio v. Evans, No. 17-CA-037-LY, 2017 WL 
2773716, at *1 (W.D. Tex. June 26, 2017); Garza v. City of Austin, No. A-08-CA-534-LY, 2009 WL 
10700446, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2009), report and recommendation adopted by No. A-08-CA-
534-LY, 2009 WL 10700498; Fitch v. Morrow, No. Civ. A. H-03-1686, 2005 WL 1828592, at *10–
11 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2005), aff’d, 199 F. App’x 347 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1278 
(2007). 
 371. Rodriguez, 556 F.2d at 1187–88, 1190–91. 
 372. Garza, 2009 WL 10700446, at *3. 
 373. Fitch, 2005 WL 1828592, at *10–11. 
 374. Nerio, 2017 WL 2773716, at *1. 
 375. Id.  
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was presented a warrant for the wrong Carlos Nerio, and the judge’s decision 
to authorize a warrant could not have been independent of the agents’ 
conduct” and, therefore, the doctrine did not apply and the plaintiff could 
proceed to trial.376  Compare a 1995 Fifth Circuit case, where the real suspect 
named Christy was tall with long, black hair and the innocent Christi was short 
with blonde hair, yet the innocent Christi was arrested for the offense.377  
Although the officer noted the physical discrepancies, he never investigated 
them before he applied for the warrant.378  The court indicated that the wrong 
arrest could have been avoided had the officer been more careful, but it 
ultimately held that the officer was only negligent, not malicious, so he was 
immune from suit.379 
It is not just the results of these cases that are inconsistent; it is also the 
rationales and the legal basis for immunizing or not immunizing the officer 
from liability based upon the application of the doctrine.  That courts have 
acknowledged “differing results” and tensions in  the doctrine’s application is 
yet another reason to abandon its use.380 
VII.  THE DOCTRINE IS REDUNDANT 
As it stands, courts that use the doctrine give officers two levels of 
protection: qualified immunity plus the independent intermediary doctrine.  
Both act as barriers to suit.  Together, they form an absolute immunity, which 
is prohibited by the Supreme Court for anyone besides judges and 
prosecutors.381  Qualified immunity provides sufficient protection; courts do 
not need to provide an additional defense.  According to Malley, the standard 
that Harlow set out is sufficient to protect officers from frivolous lawsuits: 
The Harlow standard is specifically designed to “avoid excessive 
disruption of government and permit the resolution of many 
insubstantial claims on summary judgment,” and we believe it 
 
 376. Id. at *4. 
 377. Kugle v. Shields, No. 93-5567, 1995 WL 450219, at *1 (5th Cir. July 7, 1995). 
 378. Id.  
 379. Id. at *3–5. 
 380. See Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 351 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that courts have varied in 
determining which actions are considered to be superseding causes that break the casual chain). 
 381. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (rejecting absolute immunity for officers applying 
for a warrant because “[a]s the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection 
to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”). 
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sufficiently serves this goal.  Defendants will not be immune if, on 
an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer 
would have concluded that a warrant should issue; but if officers of 
reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should 
be recognized.382 
The doctrine is also redundant because Franks v. Delaware already 
provides a procedure and a remedy to deal with lies, misstatements, and 
omissions in a warrant.383  Many cases that implicate the doctrine already raise 
Franks claims.384  In fact, the language from Franks that created the procedure 
judges use to evaluate the honesty or dishonesty of the underlying facts in a 
warrant mimics the language of the doctrine: truthful factual statements 
supporting probable cause, honest officers and affiants who believe the facts 
supporting probable cause are true, and independent magistrates who are 
informed about all facts when assessing probable cause.385  Because much of 
the concerns addressed in the doctrine are part of the Franks analysis, courts 
should be more willing to abandon the doctrine. 
VIII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S ROLE IN  § 1983 CASES 
The Fourth Amendment has utility for these types of cases for at least two 
reasons.  First, it helps courts analyze whether the defendant’s tortious 
 
 382. Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
 383. 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). 
 384. See Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483, 494–97 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Johnson 
v. Winfrey, 139 S. Ct. 1549 (2019); Smith v. Sheriff, Clay Cty., 506 F. App’x 894, 898 (11th Cir. 
2013); Hale v. Fish, 899 F.2d 390, 400 (5th Cir. 1990); Arizmendi v. Brownsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 
No. 1:16-CV-00063, 2017 WL 4479951, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 2017) (analyzing Franks and stating 
“[t]he court may make its own legal determination of probable cause in a § 1983 claim”), overruled 
on other grounds sub nom. Arizmendi v. Gabbert, 919 F.3d 891 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 220 
(2019); Hayes v. Nacogodches [sic] Cty., No. 6:15-CV-608-JDL, 2016 WL 6235510, at *7 (E.D. Tex. 
Oct. 25, 2016); Phillips v. City of Center, No. 9:15-CV-54, 2016 WL 99591, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 
2016); Richardson v. Bridges, No. 5:09-CV-186, 2015 WL 13598319, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2015); 
Braud v. Spell, No. 2:14-CV-03132, 2015 WL 7432813, at *2–3 (W.D. La. Nov. 19, 2015), aff’d, 667 
F. App’x 443 (5th Cir. 2016); Wyatt v. Anderson, No. A-13-CA-191-SS, 2014 WL 670855, at *15–
21 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2014) (removing alleged false statements from warrant); Chisolm v. DeSoto 
Police Dep’t, No. 3:12-CV-5025-M, 2013 WL 5190886, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2013); Haskins v. 
Hood, No. 1:10CV457-LG-RHW, 2010 WL 5106775, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 9, 2010); McLennan v. 
Burke, No. A-08-CA-327 LY, 2010 WL 11545939, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2010), aff’d, 425 F. 
App’x 377 (5th Cir. 2011); Arceneaux v. Louisiana, No. Civ. 04-1033, 2008 WL 2369188, at *3–6 
(W.D. La. June 10, 2008). 
 385. Franks, 438 U.S. at 164–65. 
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conduct led to a § 1983 violation.  Second, it should be considered in 
permitting successive factfinders to determine whether there was in fact 
probable cause to support the search and seizure, arrest, or continued 
prosecution.  By cutting off all review after an intermediary’s probable cause 
decision, courts are abdicating their duty to assess de novo the objective 
reasonableness of the officer’s actions, which is required under a § 1983 
analysis. 
As stated earlier, courts are not clear whether the objective reasonableness 
standard used in these cases comes from the second prong of the qualified 
immunity test or whether it comes from the probable cause standard.  The 
objective reasonableness standard is used in both civil rights claims and in 
Fourth Amendment claims that arise in the criminal procedure context.  There 
is evidence in other § 1983 claims that the Fourth Amendment objective 
reasonableness test should be used when examining civil rights violations that 
implicate the Fourth Amendment.  In 1989, the Supreme Court decided 
Graham v. Connor, a case that addressed excessive force claims.386  The 
opinion was written by conservative Chief Justice Rehnquist.387  The Court 
reasoned that it was better to analyze excessive force claims using the Fourth 
Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard rather than a rule the 
Fourth Circuit created.388  Just as the Malley Court wanted to make “clear” 
that the objective reasonableness test applies in § 1983 claims where malice 
was alleged,389 the Graham Court stated it wanted to “make explicit” that all 
excessive force claims must be analyzed using a Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness standard that examines the reasonableness of when and how 
the plaintiff’s seizure was made.390 
In Graham, the Supreme Court rejected the Fourth Circuit’s test that 
examined the officer’s subjective intent and whether he acted maliciously.391  
What mattered was whether the officer’s actions were objectively 
reasonable.392  The Court reasoned that because the Fourth Amendment 
 
 386. 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). 
 387. Id. 
 388. Id. at 391–92. 
 389. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 344 n.7 (1986). 
 390. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 
 391. Id. at 397–98. 
 392. Id. at 397 (noting that in the context of the Fourth Amendment, the question of 
“reasonableness” must be considered objectively and within the circumstances of the situation, without 
concern for intent). 
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“provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection” against 
unlawful arrests and seizures, it must be the guide for examining these civil 
rights violations.393  More recently, the Supreme Court found that a plaintiff’s 
§ 1983 claim that alleged lack of probable cause to support an arrest “fits the 
Fourth Amendment, and the Fourth Amendment fits [the plaintiff’s] claim, as 
hand in glove.”394  The Fourth Amendment provides the best test to evaluate 
Fourth Amendment civil rights violations. 
Not only is the text of the Fourth Amendment the best method to evaluate 
these claims, it is also the best guiding light for officers.  The Supreme Court 
has stated that the Fourth Amendment needs to be “readily administrable” by 
officers on the job.395  Ad hoc decisions and uncertainty in the Fourth 
Amendment context are evils the Supreme Court has repeatedly avoided.396  
The Supreme Court has favored “readily applicable” rules over “highly 
sophisticated set[s] of rules” for officers who are tasked with making quick, 
on-the-job search and arrest decisions.397  Using the same Fourth Amendment 
objective reasonableness standard for criminal procedure and civil liability 
purposes achieves that goal. 
In cases where the independent intermediary doctrine is used, courts hold 
that appellate court probable cause review is cut off by the intermediary’s 
decision.  However, appellate courts should be permitted to review whether 
the officer had probable cause to make the arrest de novo.  This review is 
required to prevent the weakening of the Fourth Amendment’s protections and 
to maintain a unified system of law.398  In Ornelas v. United States, the 
Supreme Court stated that it had never deferred to a trial court’s determination 
of probable cause or reasonable suspicion.399  The Supreme Court in the 
landmark Leon case admitted that reasonable minds often differ on whether a 
warrant affidavit establishes probable cause.400  That is to be expected.  When 
educated, law-trained professionals debate about whether probable cause in 
 
 393. Id. at 395. 
 394. Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 917 (2017). 
 395. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001). 
 396. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984) (acknowledging that using an “ad hoc” case-
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 397. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981). 
 398.  Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697–98 (1996) (noting that de novo review helps 
create well-defined rules and makes it feasible to decide beforehand whether an invasion of privacy is 
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 399. Id. at 697. 
 400. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984). 
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any given case objectively exists, it creates a legal purification process. 
De novo probable cause determinations require independent review by 
appellate courts “to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles” 
because an appellate court’s primary function is to be “an expositor of [the] 
law.”401  The Ornelas Court reasoned that de novo review unifies precedent 
and provides officers with defined rules that make upholding the Fourth 
Amendment easier.402  Had the Fifth Circuit reviewed the objective 
reasonableness of the officers’ actions in a case it clearly did not want to 
dismiss, it would have corrected the trial court’s erroneous ruling that 
insulated the officer’s unlawful actions in coercing a juvenile’s confession.403  
The Fifth Circuit was better versed in law than the trial judge who made that 
ruling.404  The correct law interpretation should have prevailed over a bad trial 
court ruling.  That the correct law did not prevail only leads to more legal 
confusion among courts and officers. 
Criminal courts have long examined probable cause de novo at any stage 
in the proceedings.405  In fact, by the time a defendant’s felony conviction is 
affirmed on appeal, probable cause for the crime in any given case could be 
determined by the arresting officer, the prosecutor, the magistrate, the grand 
jury, the trial judge, the petit jury, and the appellate court.406  Unlike the barrier 
that the doctrine has created in reviewing probable cause objectively, in a 
criminal case, one probable cause determination has no impact on another.  
Probable cause is reviewed de novo each time.  Like the de novo review of 
probable cause in criminal cases, de novo review of probable cause at any 
stage of a civil rights case is not burdensome; appellate courts have been doing 
 
 401. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697; Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985). 
 402. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697–98. 
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(2018). 
 406. See, e.g., Arizmendi v. Brownsville Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 1:16-CV-00063, 2017 WL 4479951, 
at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 2017) (analyzing Franks and stating that “[t]he court may make its own legal 
determination of probable cause in a § 1983 claim”), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Arizmendi 
v. Gabbert, 919 F.3d 891 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 220 (2019). 
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it for years, even in jurisdictions that adhere to the doctrine.407 
Finally, just as a magistrate’s probable cause determination does not 
prohibit a criminal defense attorney from filing a motion to suppress evidence 
based on a lack of probable cause to search or arrest, a magistrate’s probable 
cause determination should not prevent an objectively reasonable probable 
cause review in a civil rights case.408  The Supreme Court has made clear in a 
number of its decisions “that the magistrate’s word on probable cause [is] not 
the last word” and that the officer’s actions are to be evaluated objectively by 
a reviewing court.409 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
The independent intermediary doctrine has sown confusion and dissent 
among federal courts analyzing liability in civil rights cases.  The Supreme 
Court set out to unify circuit courts with Monroe v. Pape,410 and to create one 
test in civil rights cases invoking the Fourth Amendment in Malley v. 
Briggs.411  The Fifth Circuit’s resurrected doctrine continues to divide federal 
courts on these issues.  Using the rule endorsed by the Malley Court would 
unite precedent in this area of law.  A unified rule would provide future civil 
rights plaintiffs and lawyers better notice about their odds of winning at trial 
and on appeal, which would lead to a better allocation of judicial resources, 
along with streamlined outcomes. 
The rule has not held officers who violate civil rights accountable.412  The 
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First Circuit reasoned that the intermediary cannot be “the sole protector of 
the [F]ourth [A]mendment.”413  Officers must also be required to enforce 
Fourth Amendment rights.  A Utah district court said when it rejected the 
doctrine that it was not excusing police officers from their duty to safeguard 
Fourth Amendment rights.414  When law enforcement officers are held 
accountable, it leads to fewer arrests of innocent people, it punishes bad 
actors, and it encourages law enforcement agencies to promote training, which 
leads to fewer civil rights violations.  It is time to replace the doctrine with 
proximate cause and the Fourth Amendment, both of which have been 
endorsed by the United States Supreme Court in civil rights cases. 
  
 
(holding that an officer was not liable for arresting and harming a citizen, even though the arrest 
stemmed from an illegal stop). 
 413. Briggs v. Malley, 748 F.2d 715, 720 (1st Cir. 1984), aff’d, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).  
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*** 
